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I.

Dismissal of Equity Title

Issue # 1: Did the trial court err in finding that the plaintiffs real estate agent, Kandis
Christoffersen, acted within her authority?
Preservation of Issue: Plaintiff Posner disputed several facts regarding exactly
'i vl lat happened at Posner' ..•

-:;IL.

, I . • - . --»v

I hese disputed facts were material to

Equity's argument that its title agent Helen Smith relied on Christoffersen's authority in
closing his sale and to Posner's negligence and fiduciary breach claims, therefore
dismissal was inappropriate. [R. 478]. Posner also argued that as a matter of law, the
facts did not »upport a finding that his real estate agent Kandis Christoffersen acted

Issue # 2: Did the trial court err in concluding that defendant Equity Title Insurance
Agency, Inc. met its fiduciary duties to plaintiff0
Preservation of issue: Counsel for Posner argued that Equity I itle breached its
fiduciary obligations u» Posner when its agent failed to close his sale according to his
escn >w ii isti i i , i in n, i s [ R 4 7 4 478] [5/16/051 "'1 r pg.26-27].
II.
i>Mii' -

Dismissal of Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage
•

i f\K.\ i: K i- 'iii n ' i n ' i i i i i n NI. i i M 11 j^ i 1 ^ i; j j, i j ^ c \ \ \ i i r e p o r t ?

!

!"o avoid repetition, the applicable MJIKI UX\^ *-'iv* iew are discussed > . ^ i :ely.
-' Reierences to the trial court record appear ds [R. ]. References to transcripts of oral
arguments before Judge Medley identify the oral argument date and transcript page
number, appearing as [Date: f> j

1

Preservation of Issue: Counsel for Posner argued that the sanction for striking
Plaintiffs expert witness under the circumstances surrounding the late designation
was an abuse of discretion. [R. 1610-1617] [05/12/08: Tr. pg. 24-35, 51].
Issue # 4: Did the trial court err in dismissing plaintiffs case for lack of expert
testimony?
Preservation of Issue: Counsel for Posner argued that both statute and case law
provided sufficient legal guidance to explain the standard of care and that an expert
was not legally necessary in this case [R. 1786-1791], and that Posner's closing was
not so intrinsically complex that it needed expert testimony. [11/10/08: Tr. 43-46].
Issue #5: Did the trial court err in awarding attorney fees to Defendant Coldwell
Banker
Preservation of Issue: Plaintiff Posner argued that the determinative law in the case
was tort law, and that defendant Coldwell was not entitled to attorney fees under the
Listing Agreement because Posner did not sue for breach of that contract. [R.17831825] [11/10/08: Tr. pg. 41-54].
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for the trial court's findings of law on the following issues 1)
whether Equity Title breached its fiduciary duty to Posner, 2) whether Kandis
Christoffersen acted within her authority, 3) the dismissal of Coldwell Banker and 4) the
award to Coldwell of attorney's fees, is correctness. When reviewing a summary
judgment ruling, the Appellate Court should give no deference to the lower court's legal
conclusions and should review the legal issues presented under a correctness standard.
Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharm., Inc., 79 P.3d 922, 927 (Utah 2003). Affirmation
only proper when there is no genuine dispute as to material issues of fact and

2

the moving

*WY[Y

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wycalis v. Guardian. i nic ui

Utah, 780 P. 2d 821,, 824 (I Jtah Ct. App. 1989).
The standard of revie1 \ foi the ti ial con u t's in lpositioi I of sanctions (sti ikii ig
Posner's expert testimony) is abuse of discretion. See Featherstone v. Schaerrer, 34 P 3d

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Kilpatrick \. isuiiough Abatement, Inc.. 1 " »f i

, - , ; , . Il>>

""()ui c\ iew of a district court's 'imposition of sanctions follows a two-step
process. first, we ensure that the district court has made a factual finding that the
y's behavior merits sanctions. Second, once the factual finding has been made, we
will only disturb the sanction if "abuse of discretion [is] clearly shown." An abuse of
discretion may be demonstrated by showing the district court relied on "an erroneous
conclusion of law" or that there was "no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling."
\

A R ,62-6-1. Licensee Conduct.
6.1.11.1. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf w ho represent a
seller shall have a written agency agreement with the seller defining the scope of the
agencx.
IT A.C.A. Rl62-6-2. Stamlaius <u Practice.
6.2.1 5.1. Duties of a seller's or lessor's agent. A j'rinupal hoker and licensees
acting on his behalf who act solely on behalf of the seller ur the lessor owe the seller
or the lessor the following fiduciary duties:
(a) Loyalty; which obligates the agent to act in the ne^t interest of the -ellc .\ !lk
lessor instead of all other interests, including the agent's own;
(b) Obedience, which obligates the agent to ol^c\ ..;! Uw i'u! instructions from the
seller or lessor;
(c) Full disclosure, which obligates the agent to tell the seller or lessor all material
information which the agent learns about the buyer or lessee or about the transaction;
(d) [Omitted]
(2 ) Reasonable .•.:•'•• v ". 'sl"~ -' •
* n 1 folding safe and accounting u»r all money or property entrusted to the agent;
a-

:

(g) Any additional duties
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter arose out of the sale of a piece of real property in Park City, Utah,
belonging to the Plaintiff Dr. Michael Posner (hereinafter "Posner"), a retire
veterinarian residing in Florida. Mr. Posner commenced his action on January 31, 2004,
in Third District Court in Salt Lake City, when he filed a suit against Equity Title
Insurance Agency, Inc. (hereinafter "Equity") and Independence Title Insurance Agency
(hereinafter "Independence") [R. 1-23]. Mr. Posner claimed breached of fiduciary duty,
negligence and breach of contract against the defendants, alleging that the defendants
violated the terms of Posner's Real Estate Purchase Contract (hereinafter "REPC") when
they closed his sale without the surety bond his REPC expressly required as a necessary
condition of the sale [R. 7-10].
On February 9, 2004, Independence filed a Motion and Memorandum to dismiss
[R. 24-26, R. 27-32, which the trial court denied May 10, 2004 [R. 75]. On March 3,
2004, Equity filed its Answer to plaintiffs Complaint [R.56-66]. On December 22, 2005,
based on the discovery that his real estate agent, Kandis Christoffersen (hereinafter
"Christoffersen"), had told Posner's Equity title agent, Helen Smith (hereinafter
"Smith"), to close his sale, Posner moved to amend his complaint to add NRT, Inc., a
New Jersey corporation doing business in Utah as Coldwell Banker Residential
Brokerage (hereinafter "Coldwell") [R. 119-120]. The trial court granted permission to
amend on February 7, 2005 [R.165], and on March 28, Posner filed a First Amended
Complaint, adding Coldwell as a third defendant and dropping the breach of contract
claims against Equity and Independence [R. 323-336].
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On March 28 and 29 respectively, Equity and Independence filed Summary
Judgment Motions and Memoranda [R.258-322; R. 337-418]. Posner filed his
Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment on April 14 [R. 455-545], and the
defendants filed Reply Memoranda in the latter half of April [R. 546-566; R. 594-601].
On May 24, 2005 the Court granted summary judgment to Equity and Independence [R.
623]. Mistakenly believing that this judgment against Equity and Independence was final
for the purposes of appeal, counsel for Mr. Posner filed a notice of appeal against
Equity's dismissal on June 2, 2005 [R. 628-630]. At this time, Posner and Coldwell
Banker jointly requested, and were granted, a stay of proceedings pending the outcome of
the appeal [R. 635-637, R. 641].
Mr. Posner, Equity and Coldwell participated unsuccessfully in a mediation
conducted by the Court of Appeals in the fall of 2005. In spring of '06, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Mr. Posner's appeal without prejudice on the grounds that there had
not been a final ruling in the case.
Discovery between Mr. Posner and Coldwell commenced in the summer of 2006,
pursuant to a May '06 scheduling order. [R. 648-652]. Recognizing they needed
additional time to complete discovery, Posner and Coldwell amended their scheduling
order in early September. [R.872-874]. In October '06, Judge Medley ordered the parties
to mediate by January 7, 2007 [R. 875, 878]. Mediation occurred on December 11 and
was unsuccessful. At the end of the mediation session, Coldwell filed a motion for
summary judgment [R.883-885, 886-902], which was denied in April '07. [R. 14861488]. In the fall of '07, counsel for Posner, Michael Goldsmith, withdrew from
representation for health reasons, and Posner hired Mr. David Ross to replace him. [R.
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1520-21]. In November '07, the Court filed an Order to Show Cause. [R.1515-1518]. At
the January hearing on that Order, Mr. Ross indicated that Posner was ready to file his
certificate of readiness for trial, and on February 8, 08, filed the certificate of readiness
and request for scheduling conference. [R. 1525-1526].
The parties began preparations for trial. In March of '08, Coldwell filed a Motion
in Limine to Strike Plaintiffs Expert Witness Report [R. 1530-1558], and a Motion to
Strike Documents and Testimony Produced by the Plaintiff After the Expiration of Fact
Discovery [R.1559-1561]. Judge Medley granted both of ColdwelPs motions.[R. 16951699]. Thereafter, Coldwell submitted a second Motion for Summary Judgment
[R.1744-1754, 1755-1757], while Mr. Posner filed a cross motion requesting that both
parties be given time to designate experts [R. 1758-1760]. In November "08, Judge
Medley granted Coldwell's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, denied Posner's
Motion to Designate Experts, dismissed Mr. Posner's case with prejudice, and awarded
attorney's fees to Coldwell Banker. [R. 1842-1847]. Mr. Posner filed an appeal from the
District Court's final Order on January 6, 2009. [R. 1910-1912].
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
1) In the summer of 2002, Michael Posner retained Coldwell Banker Residential
Brokerage to list two lots he owned in Deer Valley. [R. 274]. Posner's Coldwell
real estate agent was Kandis Christoffersen. [R. 273].
2) In July, Posner negotiated a sale of his land for a purchase price of $450,000
(R.287), agreeing to provide $260,000 in seller financing. (See Addendum Index,
Exhibit A: Real Estate Purchase Contract) To ensure he would receive payment in
full, Posner inserted a condition in his Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC) that
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3) required Chris Strachan (hereinafter "the buyer") to supply a surety bond in the
same amount as his seller financing. (Exhibit A: REPC, Addendum No. 4)
4) Posner retained Equity Title Insurance Agency, Inc. as his title company [R.16].
The buyer hired Independence Title Insurance Agency of Salt Lake City as his
title company [R.79].
5) On or about August 23, Posner signed his closing papers and returned to his
residence in Florida [R. 274].
6) On or about August 28, the buyer closed with Independence [R. 21]. At closing,
the buyer supplied a document entitled "Financial Guarantee" (See Addendum
Index, Exhibit B: Financial Guarantee) (hereinafter "the Guarantee") for $260,000
and requested that Posner add $3,900 to the seller financing amount.
7) Posner approved the $3,900 increase to his seller financing from his residence in
Florida (Exhibit A: REPC, Addendum No. 9), but was never informed that the
buyer had supplied a so-called "Financial Guarantee" for $260,000 rather than a
surety bond for the full amount of the seller financing:$263,900 [R. 328].
8) Equity closed Posner's sale when Posner's real estate agent, Christoffersen,
instructed Equity escrow agent Helen Smith that Posner had seen and approved
the Guarantee and said to close [R. 57-58].
9) Strachan never made a payment on the land and defaulted on his loan from a
private mortgage company, Mustang Mortgage (hereinafter "Mustang).
10) When Posner learned of Strachan's default in November of 2002, he attempted to
collect on the Financial Guarantee but it proved worthless [R. 329]
11) To mitigate his damages, Posner bought back his land in June of 2003 for
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12) approximately $120,000 more than he had received at the time of closing [R
334].
13) In October 2, 2006 Judge Medley entered a Scheduling Order that set the
deadline for discovery cutoff at October 13, 2006, for filing dispositive motions at
November 13, 2006 and the deadline for Plaintiff to designate expert witness at 60
days after discovery cutoff date. [R.872-874].
14) October 3, 2006 Court ordered mediation on October 19, 2006. [R. 875-877].
15) October 19, 2006 Judge Medley extended deadline for mediation to January 12,
2007. [R.878-879].
16) After the October 13, 2006 cutoff date for factual discovery, Coldwell issued a
Notice of Deposition of Michael Posner on November 2, 2006. [R.880-882].
17) Coldwell deposes Michael Posner on November 20, 2006. [R.1290].
18) The parties conducted an unsuccessful mediation on December 8, 2006 [R.1619].
19) Coldwell filed its motion and memorandum for summary judgment on December
11,2006. [R.893-1042].
20) Posner's expert witness designation and report was entered by the court on
December 26, 2006. [R.1066-1071].
21) Posner submitted Notice of Readiness for Trial and Request Pretrial Conference
on 02/08/08. [R.1525-1526].
22) On 03/13/08 Coldwell filed its motion and memorandum to exclude Posner's
expert witness report. [R. 1527-1558].
23) On 03/26/08 Posner filed an opposition memorandum to Coldwell's motion to
exclude his expert witness. [R. 1610-1617].
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24) Oji 04/01/08 Coldwell filed its reply memorandum in support of motion to
exclude expert witness. [R. 1618-1624].
25) Minutes of oral argument 05/12/08. [R. 1683].
26) Affidavit of Posner's expert witness. [R. 1685-1687].
27) On 05/28/08 the court entered to exclude Posner's expert witness. [R. 1695-1699].
28) On 06/06/08 Coldwell filed its motion and memorandum for summary judgment,
based upon theory that Posner could not prove his case without expert testimony
as to the standard of care. Coldwell also filed an affidavit for attorney fees.
[R.1700-1757].
29) On 06/19/08 Posner moved the Court with a motion and memorandum requesting
an extension of time to designate an expert witness. [R.1758-1765].
30) After all filings for summary judgment and the motion to extend time were
submitted, the Court conducted a hearing for oral argument on 11/10/08. [R.
1833-1834].
31) Court on 12/08/08 denied Posner's motion for an extension of time to designate
expert witness and granted Coldwell's motion for summary judgment and for
attorney fees. [R. 1842-1851].
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
This appeal asks the Court to review several matters of law and one issue
involving judicial discretion, all arising from the Summary Judgment dismissals of
Equity and Coldwell, and the award of attorney fees to Coldwell Banker. Although
Posner's case against each defendant arises out of the same basic transaction, the relevant
facts and legal issues pertaining to each defendant are presented in two separate sections.
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I.

Dismissal of Equity Title

Posner's appeal of Equity's dismissal rests on three arguments, each of which, if
correct, provides a sufficient legal basis for reversing the trial court's ruling. First, factual
disputes existed between Posner and Equity about exactly what happened at Posner's
closing [R. 463-465]; these disputes were material to Posner's negligence and fiduciary
breach claims as well as Equity's argument regarding Christoffersen's authority, and
therefore dismissal was inappropriate Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P. 2d 821,
824 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)( Affirmation is only proper when there is no genuine dispute as
to material issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law).
Second, the finding that Kandis Christoffersen acted within her actual and/or apparent
authority was incorrect as a matter of law, as Equity did not supply documentary
evidence that Christoffersen had authority to change the terms of Posner's contract, Utah
Admin. Code Rule 162-6-1(6.1.11.1) (1993). Finally, Posner contends that Equity
breached its fiduciary obligations to Posner when Smith failed to close his sale according
to his escrow instructions, Schoepe v. Zion's First National Bank, 750 F. Supp. 1084,
1088, (D. Utah 1990), ("the scope of the escrow agent's duty is governed by the escrow
agreement, and includes, at minimum, an obligation to exercise reasonable skill and
ordinary diligence in following the escrow instructions.")
II. Dismissal of Coldwell Banker
Posner's appeal of the dismissal of Coldwell Banker (with prejudice and an award
of attorney fees) rests primarily upon his argument that the trial court abused its
discretion in striking Posner's expert testimony. As set forth below, under the
determinative standards set forth in the Utah Supreme Court case of Kilpatrick v.
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Bullough Abatement, Inc., 199 P.3d 957 (Utah 2008), the district court did not make any
of the threshold evidentiary findings necessary to sustain the sanction of striking Posner's
expert report. If Posner's expert report is reinstated on this basis, then the dismissal of
Coldwell Banker must be reversed, as the sole basis of Coldwell's second summary
judgment motion to dismiss was Posner's lack of expert testimony.
If this court determines that Judge Medley's decision to strike the expert report
was proper, Posner submits that the ruling that expert testimony was required in this case
was incorrect as a matter of law. Posner argues that, based upon the ordinary nature of
Posner's transaction, the straightforward guidance provided by statute (Utah Admin.
Code Ann. Rule 162-6-2) identifying the fiduciary duties of a real estate agent to her
principal, and Utah case law (e.g. Reese v. Harper, 329 P. 2d 410, 412 (Utah 1958);
Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876, 886 (Utah 1983), the trial court erred
when it found that a juror would not be capable of understanding Posner's transactions
and correctly applying the relevant law.
In addition to reviewing Coldwell's dismissal, this appeal also seeks a ruling on
whether, if Coldwell ultimately prevails in this case, it is entitled to attorney fees under
the terms of the Listing Agreement (See Addendum Index, Exhibit C: Listing
Agreement). Posner argues that 1) his right as a plaintiff to frame his suit as he sees fit,
Smoot v. Lund, 369 P 2d. 933, 935 (Utah 1962); 2) the established principle that a
tortious claim may arise out of a contractual relationship (DCR. Incorp. v. Peak Alarm
Co. 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983); and 3) a reasonable reading of the plain language and
purpose of the Listing Agreement (Holladay Duplex Mgmt. Co. v. Ho wells, 47 P.3d 104
(UT App 2002), are decisive authorities substantiating Posner's argument that the trial
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court's decision to award attorney fees was incorrect as a matter of law.

ARGUMENTS
I. DISMISSAL OF EQUITY TITLE
A. EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Equity argued that Helen Smith was not
liable for "relying on the representations of Posner's agent, and following her
instructions, which were clearly within the scope of her actual and/or apparent authority,
and which [were] binding upon Posner." [R. 263]. This argument rested upon three facts.
First, Equity alleged that Posner's agent "with respect to the transaction" [R. 263] was
Kandis Kristofferson. Equity's evidence [at R. 266] for this agency relationship came
from Posner's Amended Complaint [R. 273], Posner's Real Estate Purchase Contract [R.
R. 287-298], Posner's deposition [R. 286] and Christoffersen's deposition [R. 300-301].
Second, Equity alleged that on August 28, 2002, Helen Smith "telecopied" the
Guarantee to Kandis, who received and read it [R. 264]. As evidence that the telecopying
occurred, Equity cited deposition testimony from Smith's deposition in which Smith
stated that she did not recall whether she had faxed Posner a copy of the Financial
Guarantee [R. 313] but said that she had faxed a copy to Christoffersen on August 28 [R.
312], and Christoffersen's deposition, in which Christoffersen stated that Smith had faxed
her a copy of the Guarantee on August 28 [R. 302].
Finally, citing Posner's Amended Complaint [R. 275-276], Smith's deposition [R.
314], and Christoffersen's deposition [R. 306], Equity stated that on August 30, 2002,
Christoffersen informed Smith that Posner had approved the Financial Guarantee and to
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go ahead and close. At the summary judgment hearing on May 16, 2005, Equity
clarified its interpretation of why Christoffersen's instructions to Smith to close Posner's
sale fell within her authority as Posner's real estate agent. Counsel for Equity explained
that Christoffersen had not stepped into Posner's shoes, assuming to speak for him, when
she told Smith to close. Instead, Equity argued that Christoffersen was merely a conduit
who conveyed an approval by Posner, and that Christoffersen was within her authority as
his real estate agent because she was simply conveying information on behalf of Posner
regarding his sale:
"What she said was 'Mr. Posner has reviewed it and approved it, and he said to
close it.' Now, that—authority to convey that bit of information was clearly within her
authority. She had been conveying bits of information like that all the way from the
beginning when the REPCE (sic) was first signed" (May 16 '05: Tr. at 30)
In his Order dismissing Equity and Independence, Judge Medley accepted
Equity's three statements of fact when he stated: "[b]ased up on all of the undisputed
facts, legal authorities and legal analysis...set forth....Posner's agent, Kandis
Christoffersen, was acting within the scope of her actual implied and/or apparent
authority when she communicated plaintiffs approval of the Financial Guarantee." [R.
623].
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
EXISTED
In his Opposition to Summary Judgment, Posner identified several disputes about
exactly what happened at his closing [R.463-465]. These disputes materially affect the
credibility of Equity's defense that Christoffersen was acting within her authority.
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Specifically, the success of Equity's authority argument depends on the truth of several
assertions: 1) that Smith did indeed receive a copy of the Financial Guarantee and fax it
to Christoffersen on August 28, 2) that Christoffersen did receive the fax of the
Guarantee, 3) that Christoffersen did fax a copy of the $260,000 Financial Guarantee to
Posner, 4) that Christoffersen's transmission of Posner's approval to Smith was based
upon full disclosure to Posner that the buyer had submitted a $260,000 Financial
Guarantee and 5) that Posner's verbal approval was sufficient. Posner disputed each of
these allegation, and offered evidence [R. 473-473, 478] demonstrating that neither agent
informed him about the Financial Guarantee the buyer submitted, and that he never saw
nor approved it.
To dispute Equity's claim that Helen Smith telecopied the Financial Guarantee to
Kandis Christoffersen, Posner offered the following evidence:
i)

Subpoenaed phone records of Independence show no faxes to Equity
on August 28 or 29 [R. 497-515], calling into question Equity's
assertion that Smith even possessed a copy of the Financial Guarantee
when the buyer closed [R. 463-464]. Independence suggested that,
although it faxed all the other closing documents to Equity, it handdelivered the Financial Guarantee [R. 463]. Posner challenged this
explanation as unlikely, given that Independence faxed all the other
paperwork for the closing, and given that phone records from
Independence's office for the dates in question do not show a fax to
Equity's number,

ii)

Ms. Smith did not include a copy of the Financial Guarantee in the
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closing documents she assembled and sent to Mr. Posner in Florida. There was
no copy of the Financial Guarantee in Posner's file when he subsequently
returned to Equity's office at the end of September '02, (at that time, Smith had
to call Independence to request that they fax her a copy of the Financial
Guarantee) [R. 464-465].
iii)

Deposition testimony from both agents indicates that each agent
thought the other had faxed Posner a copy of the Guarantee but never
obtained positive proof i.e. a signature, of Posner's informed consent.
Christoffersen stated that Smith faxed Posner 'the surety bond' [R.
304] and Smith stated that she faxed the Financial Guarantee to
Christoffersen, but did not recall whether she had faxed it to Posner [R.
313-314].

Posner submitted an affidavit in which he stated that he never saw, discussed or
approved the Financial Guarantee with Christoffersen [R.483]. Posner explained instead
that Christoffersen told him in a telephone conversation on August 29 that the buyer had
supplied a "surety bond." Throughout her deposition, Christoffersen identified the
Financial Guarantee as "the surety bond", which is consistent with Posner's claim that he
was informed that the buyer had supplied "a surety bond." [R. 303-304]. Although
Posner alleged in his Amended Complaint that he initialed an addendum (hereinafter "the
Addendum") which changed the amount of seller financing to reflect the added the cost
of "the surety bond", he also testified that he never gave verbal approval of the Financial
Guarantee [R. 483], nor did he ever indicate in writing, anywhere, that he approved it [R.
128-129]. Copies of the Addendum Posner initialed, approving the increase in his seller
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financing to $263,900, clearly indicate that he received this fax from Kandis, and all
other closing documents carry the fax numbers of either Independence or Equity, but no
copies of the Financial Guarantee have ever been produced that show the office fax
numbers of any of the parties on the closing dates.
Finally, Posner offered evidence suggesting that Smith did not, as a factual
matter, rely on Christoffersen's instructions conveying Posner's approval, since Smith
expressly stated that she did not believe Christoffersen spoke with authority for, or in
place of, Posner himself [R. 469-471]. Smith recalled that she sent Christoffersen copies
of the closing documents to make her aware of all the information [R. 526]. Although
Smith stated that she thought she needed Posner's permission to close, she could not
recall whether she had faxed the Financial Guarantee to Posner [R. 527]. If Smith failed
to observe her duties to Posner and recognized, or should have known, that Christoffersen
had failed in hers, then Christoffersen's appearance of authority is irrelevant to
determining whether Smith was negligent or breached a fiduciary duty to Posner.
In summary, Equity's Motion for Summary Judgment rests entirely on the
argument that its agent Smith was entitled to rely on the authority of Christoffersen when
she closed Posner's sale. The fundamental premise of this argument is that both Smith
and Christoffersen adequately disclosed to Posner exactly what the buyer had supplied.
Posner has offered documentary and testimonial evidence that his agents never informed
him about the Financial Guarantee and that he never approved it. Posner's evidence
suggests Smith may never have received the Guarantee from Independence at all, thus
knew that Posner hadn't seen the Guarantee, and closed anyway. Even if Smith faxed the
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Guarantee to Christoffersen, she still closed without Posner's signature approving the
Financial Guarantee, a document written for $3,900 less than the REPC required. Either
of these scenarios supports a finding that Smith did not, in fact, rely on Christoffersen's
authority, and that she breached her fiduciary duty and/or was negligent. If there is any
doubt.. .concerning questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the [nonmoving] party." Wilkinson v. Union Pac. Railroad Co., 975 P. 2d 464 (Utah 1998);
Young v. Felornia 244 P.2d 862, cert, denied, 344 U.S. 886, 73 S. Ct. 186, 97 L. Ed. 685
(1952). At the summary judgment stage, "the judge's function is not himself to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
In order for nonmoving party to oppose successfully a motion for summary
judgment and send the issue to the fact-finder, it is not necessary for the party to prove its
legal theory; it is only necessary for nonmoving party to show facts controverting the
facts stated in moving party's affidavit. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc.
761 P2d 42 (Utah Ct App 1988). In light of the trial court's obligation to view the facts
in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, Posner contends that his evidence was
sufficient to demonstrate a genuine factual dispute. For this reason, the Trial Court erred
in dismissing Equity.

C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT POSNER'S
AGENT ACTED WITHIN HER AUTHORITY
The trial court erred in concluding that Posner's real estate agent acted within her
authority, as none of Equity's evidence satisfied the threshold requirements necessary to
make such a finding.
17

A. Actual Authority
The law in Utah requires that a real estate agent's express authority be in writing.
Utah Admin. Code, Rule 162-6-1(6.1.11.1) (1993) requires that the scope of a real estate
agent's authority be defined in a written agency agreement.4 At the summary judgment
hearing on May 16 '05 [Tr. at 21-27], counsel for Posner argued that the overriding
reason why Christoffersen lacked authority to close was that her instructions were verbal,
and that by law, as well as Posner's REPC, any and all changes to the REPC had to be
made in writing. The trial court offered the defendants an opportunity to respond to this
argument (Tr. at 28-29], which they declined.
Although Equity maintained that it was not arguing that Christoffersen had
stepped into Posner's shoes, and that instead she merely "conveyed Mr. Posner's
approval," this explanation overlooks the fact that by giving verbal instructions to go
ahead, Christoffersen effectively changed the terms of Posner's contract without
supplying written authorization of any kind. Thus, whether or not she intended to, the
concrete effect of Christoffersen's verbal instructions was that she did step into Posner's
shoes and materially change his contract; in doing so, she breached fiduciary duties she
had to fully inform Posner about the Financial Guarantee, and to properly obtain (via
written authorization), Posner's approval of the change.

3

Pursuant to U.C.A. § 61-2-5.5, creating a Real Estate Commission authorized to make
administrative rules, Utah Admin. Code Rule 162-6-1(6.1.11.1) (1993) of the Division of
Real Estate, Utah Department of Commerce requires a principal broker and licensees
acting on his behalf who represent a seller to "have a written agency agreement with the
seller defining the scope of the agency."
4
Cf. Baurnzartner v. Burt, 365 P. 2d 681, 682(Colo. 1961): The relationship between an
agent and his principal is a contractual one and the extent of the rights and duties of each
is to be found in the express or implied terms of the agency contract.
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Equity fails to demonstrate that Christoffersen had actual (express or implied)
authority, because it relies [R. 266] on Posner's deposition testimony [R. 267],5 not
written authorization, as evidence of her authority. The only document relevant to
determining the scope of Christoffersen's authority was Posner's listing agreement [R.
301; R. 468]. A listing agreement does not grant broad or general powers to a real estate
agent, but commonly confers to a brokerage the right to find a buyer for the vendor and to
receive a commission, § 13.02(b)(1), § 13.02(b)(l)(i), Agreements for Realtor's Services;
Commissions. Utah Real Property Law. See also Pilling v. Eastern and Pacific
Enterprises Trust, 702 P. d 1232, 1237 (Wash. App. 1985): (The scope of the agency
between the seller and the broker is defined by the agent's purpose, which is to find a
purchaser.); Painter v. Huke, 862 P. 2d 566, 568 (Ore. Ct. App. 1993): (listing agreement
authorizing broker to sell vendor's property "at the selling price and on the terms noted"
did not provide express or implied authority to agent to accept a buyer's offer on terms
different than those specified in the contract).
Citing Posner's testimony, Equity argued that Christoffersen had "actual and/or
apparent authority over all aspects of the closing..." [R. 266], yet Utah cases expressly
hold that listing agreements generate a narrow scope of authority that does not authorize
real estate agents to transact transfers of real property on behalf of their principals. See
Frandsden v. Gerstner, 487 P. 2d 697, 700 (Utah 1971): (A listing agreement
empowering the realtor to find a buyer does not authorize the broker in writing to execute
a contract on sale on behalf of his principal: "Thus the authority of a real estate broker
with whom lands are listed for sale does not extend to the signing of a contract for sale.
5

Citing the general rule that "Express authority exists where the principal directly states
that an agent has the authority to perform a particular act on the principal's behalf."
(emphasis added) M ,
19

The power to execute a contract of sale is an additional authority that must be expressly
granted in writing." citing Queen City Lumber Co. v. Fisher, 111 N.W. 2d 714, 716 (N.D.
1961).
Posner submitted evidence that he expressly authorized Christoffersen to help find
a buyer for his land and nothing more. [R.481, R. 301]. Equity did not refute Posner's
evidence with proof that Christoffersen" s written contract of agency included the power
to negotiate his sales terms [R. 267] or that she was Posner's "agent with specific
authority over the closing and terms of the surety bond" [R. 266]. On the contrary, the
only proof of Christoffersen's agency that Equity offered was deposition testimony
[R.267]; by law, evidence of express authority must be written. The trial court's finding
that express authority existed was therefore incorrect.
Equity also urges that Christoffersen had actual authority under the doctrine of
implied authority. When an agent is given express authority, he acquires, by implication,
the implied authority to do all that is necessary to exercise the authority expressly
granted. An agent has implied authority if his conduct fell within the scope of, or was
incidental, necessary, usual or proper to, the main authority delegated. Piston v.
Enviropak Med. Products. Inc.. 893 P. 2d 1071, 1076 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). An analysis
of actual authority, whether express or implied, focuses on the acts of the principal from
the agent's perspective. Id.
In support, Equity states that Ms. Christoffersen was Posner's "listing agent." [R.
266, R. 288]. As set forth above, however, the only express authority a listing agreement
gives is authority to help the seller find a buyer. In fact, the record demonstrates that
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Christoffersen herself did not believe she had such implied authority at closing, as she
took steps to obtain Posner's written authorization of the new amount of seller financing
[R. 304].
In giving verbal instructions to close with a document that materially breached
the terms of Posner's REPC without Posner's written authorization, Christoffersen made
a significant mistake. Her error in failing to obtain Posner's signature cannot plausibly
be characterized as "incidental, necessary or proper" Piston v. Enviropak Med. Products,
Inc., 893 P. 2d 1071, 1076 (Utah App. 1995), to the authority Posner delegated to her to
help him find a buyer for his land: her instructions to close effectively altered the express
terms of Posner's REPC and ultimately resulted in the sale of his lots to an unqualified
buyer, thwarting the very purpose for which she was hired. In addition to violating the
terms of his REPC, Christoffersen violated the very fiduciary duties of disclosure and
reasonable care that she owed to Posner as a real estate agent6. Therefore, Equity's
argument that Christoffersen had implied authority is unfounded in law.
B. Apparent Authority
"Apparent authority exists: 'where a person has created such an appearance of
things that it causes a third party reasonably and prudently to believe that a second party
has the power to act on behalf of the first person . . . . ' " (emphasis added) Walker Bank
& Trust Company v. Jones, 672 P. 2d 73,75 (Utah 1983). An analysis of apparent
authority must focus on the acts of the principal from a third party's perspective. Piston v.
6

Pursuant to U.C.A. § 61-2-5.5 and 61-2-11, Kristofferson's conduct must conform to
professional standards articulated in the Administrative Rules of the Pivision of Real
Estate, Utah Pepartment of Commerce. These standards include the prescription that that
principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf owe to their principal fiduciary duties of
care including full disclosure Utah Admin. Code Rl62-6-2(1998) (6.2.15.l.(c)) and
reasonable care and diligence 6.2.15.l.(e).
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Enviropak Med. Products, Inc., 893 P. 2d 1071,1076 (Utah App. 1995). As applied to this
case, Christoffersen had apparent authority if the evidence shows that Posner's conduct
led Equity reasonably and prudently to believe that Christoffersen could give verbal
instructions that changed her principal's REPC without his written authorization.
Equity's evidence of Posner's conduct fails to meet this threshold requirement.
Equity urges that Christoffersen had apparent authority because "listing
Kristofferson as his agent on the REPC, using her to negotiate the contract, delegating to
her the responsibility of 'making sure that we had a surety bond and how much it was and
everything else'" created the appearance of apparent authority [R. 267-268]. Merely
hiring a real estate agent to sell land is not sufficient conduct on Posner's part to create
the appearance that Christoffersen had authority to change Posner's REPC without his
written approval. Under general principles of agency law, a real estate agent is a special
agent acting under a limited power, rather than a general agent, and has the power to do
only those acts specifically named in the contract of agency, (emphasis added) 3 Am.
Jur. 2d §122 AGENCY; 12 Am Jur. 2d §88 BROKERS (See also Martin v. Vincent, 593 P.
2d 45, (Mont. 1979) (A real estate broker does not have general authority and is only
authorized to do what is specifically assigned in his contract).
The record establishes that Smith understood that Christoffersen's agency was
limited rather than general. None of Smith's actions indicate that she believed
Christoffersen possessed authority beyond helping Posner find a buyer and sell his land.
On the contrary, Smith stated in her deposition that she did not believe Christoffersen had
the authority to replace Posner and stated that she believed she needed Posner's approval
to proceed to close [R. 526-527]. Smith testified that Posner told her his attorney had
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approved the Guarantee, again showing lack of reliance on any authority possessed by
Christoffersen.7 [R. 531]. Christoffersen openly told Posner, in Helen Smith's presence,
that she had no idea what a surety bond was [R. 544-545]. Smith's decision to accept
Christoffersen's verbal representations regarding Posner's wishes, when the documents
before her plainly deviated from the express terms of Posner's REPC, is simply evidence
of her own misjudgment rather than evidence of her belief in Kristofferson's apparent
authority.
Smith's reliance on Christoffersen's authority was also inappropriate given that
apparent authority cannot be invoked by one who knows or has good reason to know the
limits and extent of an agent's authority. 3 Am. Jur. 2d § 78. See Ellis v. Nelson, 233
P.2d 1072,1075 (Nev.1951):
.. .there can be reliance only upon what the principal himself has said or done, or
at least said or done through some other and authorized agent. The acts of the agent in
question can not be relied upon as alone enough to support an estoppel. If his acts are
relied upon there must also be evidence of the principal's knowledge and acquiescence in
them. Moreover, in any case, the reliance must have been a reasonable one, consistent
with the exercise of reasonable prudence, and the party who claims reliance must not
have closed his eyes to warning or inconsistent circumstances, (emphasis added).
Utah cases uphold this limitation: See Bodell Construction Company v. Stewart
Title Guaranty Company, 945 P. 2d 119, 124 (Utah App. 1997); City Elec. V. Dean
Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P. 2d 89,90 (Utah 1983); Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P. 2d 74,
78 (Utahl982), citing Dohrmann Hotel Supply Co. v. Beau Brummel Inc., 103 P. 2d
650, 651 (Utah 1940): one who deals with an agent has the responsibility to ascertain the
agent's authority despite the agent's representations. Reliance on apparent authority is

Posner's attorney supplied an affidavit stating he never saw the Financial Guarantee
prior to closing [R. 586-587].
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also not justified where it is inconsistent with the circumstances of the transaction. 3 Am.
Jur. 2d § 78 AGENCY. See also Simpson v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 248 N.E.
2d. 117, 120 (111. 1969). The mere fact that Smith chose to rely on Christoffersen is not
itself evidence of Christoffersen's authority; indeed, as previously mentioned, Smith
stated she did not think that Christoffersen was acting in place of Posner.
On the facts of the case, Helen Smith knew or had good reason to know Kandis
Christoffersen did not have the authority to change Posner's REPC without his written
approval. Helen Smith was not an uninformed third party in this transaction but Posner's
escrow agent [R. 519] with a fiduciary duty to him. 9 It was neither prudent nor
reasonable for Smith to rely on verbal instructions from Christoffersen without a written
signature from Posner. Equity's assertion of apparent authority is an attempt to escape
liability for its agent's failure to act to protect Posner's interests. None of the evidence
supplied in Equity's motion for summary judgment can correctly be construed as
sufficient to support a finding of apparent authority. "[A] genuine issue of fact exists
where, on the basis of the facts on the record, reasonable minds could differ on whether
defendant's conduct measures up to the required standard." Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 94
P. 3d 301, 304 (Ut. Ct. App. 2004), citing Jackson v. Dabnev. 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah
1982).
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT EQUITY DID NOT
BREACH A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO POSNER

"Authority is not 'apparent' simply because the party claiming has acted upon his
conclusions." Tsouras v. Southwest Plumbing and Heating, 587 P. 2d 1321, 1323 (Nev.
1978).
9
Freegard v. First Western National Bank, 738 P. 2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987)
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Utah escrow agents owe a fiduciary duty of care to the parties to an escrow. In
Freegard v. First Western National Bank, 738 P. 2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court noted "it is well established that an escrow agent assumes the role of the
agent of both parties to the transaction, and as such, a fiduciary is held to a high standard
of care in dealing with its principals." See also New West Federal Savings and Loan
Assoc, v. Guardian Title Company of Utah 818 P. 2d 585, 589 (1991 Utah App.); Hertz
v. Nordic Limited. Inc.. 761 P. 2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1988).10
Although an escrow agent's fiduciary duty may vary somewhat according to
jurisdiction, courts agree that the core of the escrow agent's fiduciary duty is to follow
the escrow instructions. See, e.g., Schoepe v. Zion's First National Bank, 750 F. Supp.
1084, 1088, (D. Utah 1990), (noting Utah courts have endorsed the principle that "the
scope of the escrow agent's duty is governed by the escrow agreement, and includes, at
minimum, an obligation to exercise reasonable skill and ordinary diligence in following
the escrow instructions." (Additional cites omitted)
In the instant case, Posner's escrow agent, Helen Smith, closed his sale with a
document that, in both name and amount, did not match the specific requirements of the
REPC terms. Despite the discrepancies between the REPC terms and the Guarantee, and
despite the fact that Smith was an agent who owed a fiduciary duty of care to Posner,
Equity's phone records show no fax to Posner's residence in Florida prior to his closing
[R. 461; R. 504-515]. As alleged in the Equity's summary judgment motion, the sole
10

This principle is recognized in other jurisdictions as well: The escrow agent must
strictly comply with the instructions of the principals. See, e.g., Manley v. Ticor, 798 P.
2d 1327, 1331 (Az. Ct. App 1989): "[H]e must conduct the affairs with which he is
entrusted with scrupulous honesty, skill, and diligence." National Bank of Washington v.
Equity Investors, 506 P. 2d 20, 35 (Wash. 1973).
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foundation upon which Ms. Smith based her decision to close was that Posner's real
estate agent told her that Posner had approved the Guarantee and said that closing could
occur. Ms. Smith closed without requesting or receiving written authorization of the
Guarantee from Mr. Posner.
The evidence plainly establishes that Smith knew Posner's closing documents
needed to meet the terms of his REPC [R. 519-520]. To ensure that she reasonably and
diligently followed Posner's escrow instructions, Smith needed, at minimum, to notify
Posner of the discrepancy between the amount of seller financing he required at closing
($263,900) and the amount for which the Financial Guarantee was written ($260,000) and
take steps to make sure that the closing numbers matched the REPC requirements. To
verify that Christoffersen's instructions were proper and accurate, Smith should have
insisted that Christoffersen supply Posner's written approval of the Financial Guarantee,
or else contacted him herself. When she failed to follow Posner's escrow instructions,
Smith breached her fiduciary duty to Posner, therefore, the trial court's ruling that Equity
did not breach its fiduciary duties to Posner is incorrect as a matter of law.

II.

DISMISSAL OF COLDWELL BANKER

A. EVIDENCE SUPPORTING DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL
1. Striking Expert Witness: The Court, upon its own analysis, determined that
the deadline for Posner to designate an expert witness under the October 2, 2006
Scheduling Order (hereinafter the "Scheduling Order") was December 12, 2006, and not
the December 14 deadline Posner's counsel had calculated. The Court further found that
an unsigned copy of the 12/14/06 cover letter Posner's counsel sent to Robert Ponte that
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identified Gage Froerer as an expert [R. 1617; R. 1835] was insufficient proof of a
December 14, 2006 mailing . Coldwell Banker claimed that it did not receive Plaintiffs
designation until December 26, 2006 [Rl066-1071], the day counsel for Posner filed the
expert designation and report with the Court and the day Coldwell claims it received
Posner's Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment [05/12/08: Tr. p.8], lines 18-19;
P. 35, lines 10-15]. The Court found that Coldwell Banker would suffer prejudice for the
reasons set forth in their Memoranda in support of the Motion to Strike, and with trial
date set for June 2008, n the Court was satisfied that the two week late December 2006
expert designation would prejudice Coldwell Banker. [05/13/08: Tr. p. 5].
2. Grant of Summary Judgment to Coldwell Banker
The trial court concluded [11/12/08: Tr. p. 3] that the standard set forth in Preston
& Chambers, P.C. v. Koller, 943 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) applied. The Court
held that an expert witness was only unnecessary where the propriety of the defendant's
conduct is within the common knowledge and experience of the layman, and the alleged
misconduct is so obvious that no reasonable juror could fail to comprehend the breach of
the duty. In finding that expert testimony was necessary in Posner's case, the trial
referenced the complexity of the closing of Posner's real estate transaction.
For example, the court noted that closing was a split closing involving a title
company for the buyer and a separate title company for the seller. The closing involved
separate pre-signed closing papers, signed at different times by the buyer and the seller.
[11/12/08: Tr. p. 4] One issue facing the jurors involved the fact that the buyer
substituted an instrument entitled "Financial Guarantee" for the surety bond Posner's
11

Motion in Limine to Exclude the Testimony of Plaintiff s expertfiled03/13/08 and Court on 03/20/08 set
trial dates for 6/17 thru 6/19/06 [R. 1603].
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REPC required. [11/12/08: Tr. p. 4] Some confusion existed as to whether the fiduciary
duty imposed on the realtor arose from statute, case law or the Listing Agreement
between Posner and Coldwell. The Court found that Posner's split closing that involved
a title company for the buyer and a separate title company for the seller, separate presigned closing papers that were signed at different times by the buyer and the seller, the
seller's carry back interest and the fact that the buyer substituted an instrument entitled
"Financial Guarantee" for the surety bond required by the Real Estate Purchase Contract
[11/12/08: Tr. p. 4], were all factors that constituted specific circumstances beyond the
ken of the average juror. [11/12/08: Tr. p. 4] [R.1749].

3. Evidence supporting the Trial Court's Award of Attorney Fees
The Court awarded Coldwell Banker its attorney fees in this matter based on
ColdwelPs successful Summary Judgment Motion to Dismiss. The trial court found that
the Listing Agreement between Posner and Coldwell Banker was determinative in this
matter. The court noted that the Listing Agreement provided, in part, at paragraph 8:
"...in case of the employment of an attorney in any matter
arising out of the Listing Agreement (including the sale of
the Property) the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive
from the other party all costs and reasonable attorney fees
whether the matter is resolved through court action or otherwise."
In awarding fees to Coldwell, the Court found that but for the Listing Agreement, there
would not have been any relationship between Coldwell banker and Posner, and that
under these circumstances, Coldwell Banker was entitled to fees under paragraph 8 of the
Listing Agreement. [11/12/08: Tr. p. 6].
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B. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN STRIKING
THE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT REPORT
The district court abused its discretion in striking Posner's expert witness report
because 1) it failed to make the evidentiary findings required to impose such a sanction
under rule Rule 37(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (See Kilpatrick v.
Bullough Abatement, Inc., 199 P.3d 957, 967 (Utah 2008), and moreover, the evidence of
Posner's conduct in submitting the expert report does not reflect misconduct, and 2)
contrary to Rule 37(b)(2)(C) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, striking the expert
report was unjust.
1. The Trial Court's Order failed to make the Required Evidentiary Findings
The standard for reviewing a trial court's imposition of discovery sanctions is
abuse of discretion. See Pete v. Youngblood, 141 P.3d 629, 632 (Utah Ct. App. 2006):
"We review the trial court's imposition of sanctions for failure to comply with [rule 26],
including the exclusion of testimony, for an abuse of discretion." The trial court derives
its power for imposing discovery sanctions from Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
16(d) and Rule 37(b)(2). Rule 16(d) states:
"Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling order
, the
court, upon motion ...., may make such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among
others, any of the orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B),(C),(D)." (Emphasis added)
Rule 37(b)(2) states:
"Sanctions .... If a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 16(b)...,
unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified, the court in which the
action is pending may take such action in regard to the failure as are just, including the
following: (b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, ....dismiss the action
"
(Emphasis added).
Recently the Utah Supreme Court delineated the elements that must exist for a
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trial court to impose sanctions. A trial court must provide factual findings that the party's
behavior merits sanctions. Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., 199 P.3d 957, 967
(Utah 2008). Once the factual finding has been made, "we will only disturb the sanction
if "abuse of discretion [is] clearly shown." Id.:
An abuse of discretion may be demonstrated by showing that the district court
relied on "an erroneous conclusion of law" or that there was "no evidentiary basis for the
trial court's ruling." Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court then explained that sanctions are warranted only when the party's
conduct meets certain criteria: Sanctions are warranted when "(1) the party's behavior
was willful; (2) the party has acted in bad faith; (3) the court can attribute some fault to
the party; or (4) the party has engaged in persistent dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the
judicial process.'" Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., 199 P.3d 957, 967 (Utah
2008) referencing Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 276 (Utah 1997).
In this case, the trial court made factual findings that there was no proof of service
of the expert designation on December 14, 2006, that Posner's counsel's word that she
had sent the designation on December 14 was insufficient, and that the first receipt of the
expert designation was December 26, 2006, after the December 12 deadline. The court
concluded that the untimely filing would prejudice Coldwell Banker if Posner were
allowed to use its expert witness. [05/13/08: Tr. p. 5]. There were no factual findings
that Posner's conduct deserved sanctions, nor were there specific findings of a willful
failure to obey, bad faith, fault or persistent dilatory disobedience. The Record itself does
not reflect any persistent dilatory disobedience.
On the contrary, Posner's Memorandum in Opposition set forth Posner's good
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faith effort to supply the expert report in a timely fashion. Posner's counsel thought she
was timely filing the expert witness designation when she served Coldwell on December
14, 2006. [R.1612]. Coldwell also believed this date to be the deadline. [R.5132].
Posner's counsel also explained her assumption that, as a result of Mediation Order, the
Scheduling Order no longer applied to either party but that both parties were proceeding
on a good faith basis, noting: "... in my view, once the Court ordered ...mediation, my
own view was it doesn't make sense to spend money on any steps towards litigation until
we see the outcome of this mediation." [05/12/08: Tr. p. 32, lines 22-25].
Coldwell Banker likewise believed that the Order to Mediate amended the
Scheduling Order: "At the conclusion of fact discovery, and because the scheduling order
had been informally amended by the Court's order to attend mediation, Coldwell Banker
filed a dispositive motion .. it's motion for summary judgment immediately following the
mediation .. the unsuccessful mediation." [05/12/08: Tr. p. 4, lines 3-7] (emphasis added).
Coldwell noted that because of the mediation "we sat on [the summary judgment motion"
as its explanation for not filing by the November 13 '06 deadline. [05/12/08: Tr. p.38,
lines 16-22] [R.1620] Coldwell issued a notice of deposition of Plaintiff on 11/02/06 and
took his deposition on 11/20/06, after the fact discovery cutoff date of October 13, 2006
set forth in the Scheduling Order [R. 880-882 Notice of Deposition; 1290 Deposition;
and, 872-874 Scheduling Order]
In effect, both parties stated that the order to mediate affected the dates of their
filings under the Scheduling Order. This was not an unreasonable result, and suggests
that the parties had a tacit agreement of the kind mentioned in Berkshires, L.L.C. v.
Sykes, 127 P.3d 1243, 1246 (Utah Ct. App. 2005), where the Court of Appeals
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determined that since both sides filed motions late/'.. .the parties had 'tacitly agreed' to
ignore the cutoff dates."
Despite Posner's evidence that his submission of the expert report reflected no
misconduct, the trial court concluded that the untimely submission merited a sanction and
struck the report. However, contrary to determinative criteria for imposing sanctions set
forth in Kilpatrick, the trial court made no factual finding that the Posner's behavior
warranted sanctions, nor did it supply any evidentiary findings establishing that one or
more of the four types of conduct meriting sanctions had occurred. Instead, as
justification for striking Posner's expert, the court cited prejudicial effect. Under
Kilpatrick, prejudice is not a sufficient evidentiary basis for imposing a sanction. See Id
at 965: "The willfulness requirement cannot be satisfied by showing mere prejudice.
Rather, there must be evidence that the noncompliance was the product of willful
failure." The trial court in this case abused its discretion in striking Posner's expert report
because it did not make the evidentiary finding required to imposition of such a sanction,
nor do the facts support such a finding.
2. The Trial Court's Decision to Strike the Plaintiffs Expert Report was Unjust
Under Rule 37(b)(2)(C) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may take
any action that is "just," including onerous sanctions such as dismissing the action or
rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party. Striking Posner's expert
report under the circumstances of this case was not such a "just" action. When the district
court denied Posner's Motion to Designate Experts, and simultaneously granted
Coldwell's Motion to Dismiss based on lack of expert testimony, it effectively
transformed a sanction which kept Posner from presenting certain testimony at trial into a
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sanction which denied Posner the right to a trial by jury. Given this consequence, the
Utah Supreme Court cautionary words in Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d
271, 280 (Utah 1997) are apposite: "Indeed, constitutional due process rights may be
violated if a court refuses to hear the merits of the case where there has been a relatively
trivial infraction of procedural rules. See Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536,
1542-43 (11th Cir. 1993). Thus/[dismissal is generally imposed only for egregious
misconduct, such as repeated failure to appear for deposition.' Regional Refuse Sys., Inc.
v. Inland Reclamation Co. 842 F.2d 150, 155 (6th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added)."
Sanctions that result in dismissal of a plaintiff s case are a severe remedy that may violate
due process.

Although a trial court maintains substantial discretion to decide

appropriate sanctions, this discretion is not unbridled: "Dismissal is 'the most extreme
sanction provided for in the rule, and the Supreme Court has emphasized the necessity for
cautious use of the rule... [It] should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances." In
re Liquid Carbonic Truck Drivers, 580 F.2d 819, 822 (5th Cir. 1978). Posner's filing of
the expert report within 14 days of the deadline, particularly under the circumstances of
mediation order, did not rise to the level of egregious misconduct outlined in In re Liquid
Carbonic Truck Drivers. Given the absence of an evidentiary basis for any egregious

M

[T]here are constitutional limitations upon the power of the courts . . . to dismiss an
action without affording a party the opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his
cause. f'(fn29) The Supreme Court has held that rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure "should not be construed to authorize dismissal. . . when it has been
established that failure to comply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad
faith, or any fault of petitioner." Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., 199 P.3d 957,
966-67 (Utah 2008) citing Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et
Commercials, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958).
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conduct on the part of Posner in its Order, the district court's decision to strike Posner's
expert testimony and then dismiss his case for lack of expert testimony was not a just
action.
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CASE
FOR LACK OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
The trial court erred in concluding that expert testimony was necessary in Posner's
case because, as a matter of law, Utah cases and statutes on the fiduciary duty of care a
real estate agent owes her principal are straightforward and easily understood, and
because there is nothing intrinsically difficult to understand about Posner's closing.
Relevant Utah statutes and case law supply sufficient guidance for jurors charged
with determining whether a real estate agent breached her fiduciary duty to her principal.
On the matter of fiduciary breach by a real estate agent, the language of
Administrative Rule 162-6-2 is simple and straightforward: a principal broker and
licensees acting on his behalf owe the fiduciary duties of loyalty, obedience, full
disclosure, confidentiality and reasonable care and diligence to their principal. This
provision clearly articulates what duties a real estate agent owes.
Second, several Utah cases provide straightforward guidance on when the duties of
care and disclosure are breached. For example, in Reese v. Harper, 329 P. 2d 410, 412
(Utah 1958), the Supreme Court considered whether the seller's agent had adequately
disclosed the details of an offer to buy plaintiffs property. The defendant (seller) sought
a purchase price of $45,000. Seller's agent brought the defendant an offer for $30,000,
which seller signed under the mistaken understanding that the $30,000 also included a
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promise to pay approximately $15,000 in encumbrances (which would have brought the
total value of the offer to the original asking price of $45,000). Significantly, the Court
found that even though the agent had actually shown the seller the Receipt and
Agreement to Purchase, which bound seller to the sale, the seller's agent had nonetheless
failed to inform and explain to the seller fully of all the facts material to the transaction,
specifically that the Receipt required seller, not buyer, to pay the encumbrances. The
circumstances in Reese closely resemble the facts of Posner's case, where the real estate
agent allegedly saw a document that the buyer submitted, but failed to inform Posner
about what the buyer supplied and failed to obtain Posner's signature approving the
document.
Utah courts have also considered the duty of reasonable care and diligence:
"In light of the duty of a real estate salesman and his broker to exercise reasonable
skill and diligence on behalf of the principal they represent, we ... continue to hold, that
the principal is justified in relying upon information received from the salesman and
broker without making an independent investigation. Phillips v. JCM Development
Corp.. 666 P.2d 876, 886 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added).
In Phillips, the Court found a breach of fiduciary duty when his real estate
agent failed to obtain important financial information about the buyer that that his
principal the seller, had requested. Id. Like the plaintiff in Phillips, Posner had a clear
requirement. Ms. Christoffersen understood that the surety bond was a critical back up
to Posner's seller financing and indeed, that the entire sale was conditioned Posner's
receipt of a surety bond at closing. Christoffersen obtained Posner's signature
approxing the addition of an increase of $3,900. to $263,900 to his seller financing
amount but did not inform him that the document was titled "Financial Guarantee" and
was written for $260,000. nr obtain his signature approving this change in his REPC,
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even though she knew the REPC required a surety bond equal to seller financing
amount.
Relative to juror's possible difficulty in distinguishing a ''Financial Guarantee"
from a "surety bond", Posner properly and timely designated an expert witness to
explain this difference to jury [R. 178-179]. As for the remaining issues that the trial
court identified as too complex for an average person to understand, there is nothing
that cannot be explained in a manner a jury could easily comprehend, nor are the
features of Posner's closing particularly unusual. For example, split closings are
permitted by law in Utah, and the law places no restrictions upon who may participate
in a split closing. Moreover, signing papers and reviewing closing papers are activities
that are the same whether a lay person is closing with one title company or two. The
"subordinated carry-back interest" is nothing more than the seller financing part of the
buyer's loan and allowing the conventional mortgage company to have a first security
position, while the seller takes a second position. Pre-signing loan papers is not
uncommon or difficult. Except for the financial guarantee v. surety bond, the
remaining items are not complex and certainly within the competency of a jury. The
jury in Posner's case will be called upon to make findings on whether certain events
occurred (for example, whether Coldwell Banker agent Kristofferson informed Posner
that the buyer had not supplied a surety bond but an instrument labeled "Financial
Guarantee," or that it was not in the amount called for in the addendum that
Kristofferson presented to Posner to sign). The jury will then have to determine
whether, if such acts/omissions occurred, they amounted to a breach of Kristofferson's
fiduciary duties to Posner. These are issues juries face and decide every day.
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D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING COLDWELL BANKER
ITS ATTORNEY FEES
In his Amended Complaint, Posner asserted a tort claim against Coldwell. The
trial court's decision to award Coldwell attorney fees was incorrect because the court
based this award on a term in the contract (Listing Agreement) between Posner and
Coldwell, not upon the application of a tort law principle in Posner's tort law claim.
Posner chose to sue for fiduciary breach because 1) a real estate agent owes her
principal the fiduciary duties of reasonable care, diligence and full disclosure (U.A.C.A.
Rl 62-6-2), and 2) because "fiduciary breach" most closely described the conduct of his
agent when she instructed his title company to close without obtaining his signature
authorizing acceptance of the Financial Guarantee. It was Posner's determination that, if
he sued for breach of contract under the Listing Agreement, Coldwell could argue that no
breach had occurred: the Listing Agreement promises to sell listed property for the listed
sales price, and indeed, the price listed in the REPC, and the price at Posner's closing,
was the price Posner agreed to: $450,000. In choosing to sue under tort, Posner exercised
his right to frame his claim on the facts as he knew them. Smoot v. Lund, 369 P 2d. 933,
935 (Utah 1962) (a plaintiff may frame his case under any theory the facts of the case
will support).13
The fact that it was the Listing Agreement that brought Coldwell Banker and
Posner together does not prohibit Posner from suing in tort, nor should it subject him to
the burdens and remedies contained in that contract. Utah courts expressly recognize that
([Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] Rule 18(a) provides that a party may "join either as
independent or as alternate claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both as he
may have against an opposing party.")
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tortious conduct may arise out of a contractual relationship. D'Elia v. Rice Development,
Inc., 147 P.3d 515, 523-524 (Ut App. 2006) (We begin by noting that f,[i]n Utah, a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty is an independent tort that, on occasion, arises from a
contractual duty." Norman v. Arnold. 57 P.3d 997, 1006 (Utah 2002) (additional cites
omitted). Likewise, in DCR. Incorp. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983),
the Supreme Court noted:
A party who breaches his duty of due care toward another may be found liable to the
other in tort, even where the relationship giving rise to such a duty originates in a
contract between the parties...: [A] wrongful act committed in the course of a
contractual relationship may afford both tort and contractual relief, and in such
circumstances the existence of the contractual relationship will not bar the injured party
from pursuing redress in tort, (emphasis added) [Quoting Peterson v. Sherman, 68
Cal.App.2d 706, 157 P.2d 863 (1945).]
It is clear from the above quoted Supreme Court decision that, having sued in tort,
Posner is entitled to have tort law determine the outcome of his case.
Additionally, a close reading of the Listing Agreement does not compel the
conclusion that it applies to Posner's claim:
1) The mere recitation in the Listing Agreement of a fiduciary duty does not
render Posner's fiduciary breach claim a breach of contract claim. Unlike other truly
bargained-for terms, Coldwell was not at liberty to bargain about its fiduciary duty with
Posner; the Utah legislature has determined that real estate agents, for public policy
reasons, owe their clients a fiduciary duty of care. Thus, by virtue of U.A.C.A. R162-62, Coldwell's fiduciary duty existed regardless of whether Posner's Listing Agreement
mentioned it.
2) The plain language of paragraph 8 of the Listing Agreement limits fees to
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".. .any matter arising out of'the Listing Agreement..." The plain language of the contract
suggests its purpose is to ensure that the listed property is sold at the listed price. It is far
from clear that the Listing Agreement language was intended to cover circumstances like
Christoffersen's transmission of Posner's alleged approval of a document pertaining to
his seller financing. A reasonable interpretation of the term "arising out o f is that it
refers to attorney fees associated with actions arising out of claims related to the sale of
the property at the listed price, not fees associated with tort claims pertaining to actions
arising outside of the intended scope of the Listing Agreement, though still falling within
a real estate agent's fiduciary duties of disclosure and care, (emphasis added). "[I]t is [the
trial] court's duty to enforce the intentions of the parties as expressed in the plain
language of the [contract's] covenants." Holladay Duplex Mgmt. Co. v. Howells, 47 P.3d
104 (UTApp 2002).
In summary, based on Posner's right as a plaintiff to frame his suit as he sees fit,
to have tort law apply when he has sues in tort, and upon a reasonable reading of the
plain language and purpose of the Listing Agreement, the trial court's decision to award
attorney fees under a term in the Listing Agreement was incorrect as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Michael Posner respectfully requests that this Court 1) reverse the trial
court's dismissal of Equity because existing factual disputes should have precluded the
grant of summary judgment, and/or 2) reverse the trial court's findings that Posner's real
estate agent acted within her authority and that Equity breached no duty to Posner, and 3)
remand this case for trial.
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Posner also requests that for the reasons set forth, this Court 1) find that the trial
court abused its discretion in sanctioning Posner by striking his expert report, which led
to the dismissal of his case, and/or 2) reverse the trial court's ruling that expert testimony
on the standard of care was necessary, remanding this case for trial. For the reasons
stated, Posner also requests that this Court reverse the trial court's award of attorney fees
under the Listing Agreement.
Dated this 30th day of April, 2009.

Catherine James
David E. Ross II
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
Michael C. Posner
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Exhibit B Financial Guarantee
Exhibit C Listing Agreement
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Settlement Deadline referenced k\ Section 24(d). or
on a dale upon Which Bjyer and Seller agree in writing. 'Settlement- shall occur only when all of the folbwir.o haya been
completed* (a) Buyer and SeHer have signed and delivered to eaoh other ortothe escrow/dosing office ail documents required
by tw* Contract, hy the Lender, by Written escrow Instructions or by applicable Uw; (b) any moni es reguired lo be paid by Duyer
under these doaintente (except for the proceeds of any new loan) have been delivered by Buyor to Sciferor to the
owenclosing Mfioo in the fohn of coKeded or deewi funds; and (c) any moniesrequiredto be paid by Seller undei these
documents hav* been delivered by Seller to^Buyer or to the escroi«fcJo$ing office in the form of collected or cleared funds,
Seller and 0u>£r shall each pay one-half C*) of the f*« charoed by tfa oscroWdwing office for >ts services lt\ the
be made as of tlie SettlCTient Deadline date referenood in Section 24(d) uri^n otherwtee agreed to m <vritina by tha pames
nc,l te l,

Such writing
u ' 5 < Jf wwemant etatement Th« transaction wW be considered closed whan Settlement has bean
oompleted, and nen an ot
the foltowing teve been oompieted. (ij tne proceeds of any new loan hava been delivered by the
Lender to teller to th9^oj)r/oIottng cftee; and (h) the applicadie Closing documents have beenrecordedIn the orfioe ct
tho county
dMCrih9d
,n
P 1 ^ (0 and (ii) of th» preceding sentence shall bt complcred within four
calendar days S e m e n i t

?'j O H ^ ^ e o f e

Se,Ief

l J Other (s

^^^ ^ ^ ^ ^y^ 0 3 1 P°«»«s«on l 0 B ^ ^ ^ thFn: 0 ^ ^

h<HJr ,

(j

d^^ftar Closing;

OLAGEK^ptsaoSUfiE. Ax the sigmng of this Contract*
Initiate

{ td/IBuyeralnkUilaK
repfesant^J^ Sailer ( ] Buyer [ J both Buyer and Seller
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& TITLE INSURANCE. Al Settlement, 8ewtf agrees to pay for a standard coven*** own«^ policy of arte insurance nsurino
Buyer In the amount of the Purchase Pnce.
7, SELLER DISCLOSURES- No latar than tha Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Sectfon 24(b), Seller shall provide
to Buyer the fottowmfl documents which are collectively referredtoas the "Sefisr Disdotures*:
(a) a Seller property condition disclosure for Ihe Property, signed end dared by Seller.
(b) a commitment for the policy d title insurance;
(c) a copy o' any teases affecting the Property not expirino pnor to Closing;
(d) wnnen notice of any claims and/of conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or
zoning oode violations; and
(e) Other (specify) ^
a. BUYER'8 RIGHT TO CANCEL BASEO ON EVALUATTOMS AND INSPECTIONS. Buysrt obtyslion to purchase under
; Cont/ect (check applicable bote*):
IIS [ I IS NOTconditioned upon Buyer's approval of theconterto<aKth6Se<lif DlsoJc^resr0fftr«noedinSe«ton7;
|IS [ 1 IS NOT condftfemed upon Burr's approval tf^
|IS ( ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer* approval of the Wlow<natwtterxlivrrfvafion$ of the Property. (cpec«fy)
ir any at me aUveItems are• olfttoiced inlhe afflrmauve. then Section* 8/1, e i . $.3 and M apply; othwwtes, they do not apply.
The Items cfwckad In the affirmative above are collectively referred to as the "Evaluations & Inspections." Unless otherwise
provided in this Contract, the Evaluations & Inspections enaH be paid for by Buyer end shell bo conducted bytadfvWualsor
entities o? Buyer's choice Seller agrees to cooperate *4th the Evaluations & Inspections and with the walk-through Inspection
under Soolion 11.
9.1 Evaluations & Inspactiofte Deadline. No \H* man the Evaluations & Inspection* Deadline referenced in Section
24(p) Buyer shell: {a)oompfete all Evaluations & Inspections: andto)determine if ihe Evaluations A Inaction* EJ6 acceptable
to Buyer.
a.2 Kght to Canc#< or Obiaci If Buyer determines ihat th« Evaluations a Inspections are unacoepttbl^ Buyer may.
no later than the Evaluations & Inspections Oaaflfoe, efther: (a) cancel ttts Contract by providing written notfce to Srileu
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit she!) be nrteased to Buyer; or (b) provide 9efter with vwntten nofce of objections,
63 Failure to Respond. If by the expiration ot me Evaluations & Inspections Deadline. Buys** doe* not <a) cancel this
Contract as provided In Section 8,2; or (b) deliver a written o^eatbn to Seller regarding the Evaluations & Inspections, t>ie
Evaluations & Inspections shall be deemed approved by buyer.
64 Response by Seller. If Buyer providm^en objector* B
after &$\ltfs. receipt of Buyer's objections (the Ttesponae Period! in which to w e e in writing upon Ihe manner of rooMnfl
Buyer's objeotfons. Softer may. but shall not be required to, resoK/e Buyer's objections. If Buyer and Seller have not agreed
In writing upon the manner of resoh/fng Buyers objections,fiuyarmay oanoel tm Contract by providlra written notice toseiier
no later than three calendar days afttr expiration of the Response Period; whenwpon tha Earniet Money Doposa shall be
reaped to Buyer. If thtetoitr^fcnoc earned by B u ^
by Buyer. This walvor shall not affect those Items warranted In Section 10.
& ADDITIONAL TERMS, There^ARE 11 ARE NOT addenda to this Contia« containing adoW^
If there a/e,
thetermsof the following addenda a/* incorporated rrto this Contract by this teference; MAddendum No. f
( J Survey AddewlumT^SeilerRtwtdng Addendum r J FHA/VA Loan AddendfimT J Awimptton Ad&ndum
I J Usd-Beeed Paint Addendum (in some transactions this addendum Is required by lew)
[ 1 Other (epecHy) _
10. SELLER WARRANTIES t REPRESENTATIONS.
x» 1° » C o ha dt } %Cnk w?l n*s rb^
S ^ «&****& ft* Softer has fee We to the Property and wNI convey good imd ma*otahfe
v
^ ^ ! ^ H
.
^ ^ f a l **"***/ **<*• «P^« the sale h being meSTpursuant to a regf c&ate contract which
wovidss for tide toa
to pass at a later date. In ihat caae. tide tfl be convayed » accordanoe with the ixwi^offihaContract.
fe^ffiilS^
^^'?
tothe
Property wWedtothe foiling maitera of record' eaSmcrfe, <&$rHuBons,
CC&R s (meanlna covenant, conditions and restnobons). and rights-of-wty; ard subjoct to the contents d Iho Commitment
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for Title Instance as agreed to by Buyer under Section 8. Buyer also agree* to take the Property stbjoct to exuung leases
affeclioa the Propeity and not expire pftof 10 Ckawng. Buyer Agrees to be responsible for taxes, assessment*, homaownera
association dues, ulilitlas, and other services provided to the Property after Closing. Except for any loenfa) specifically
assumed by Buyer writer Section 2.1(c), Seller will cause to be paid on by Closing ell morqjages, trust dcecs, judgments,
mechanic's Bens, tax liens and warrants. Seller will cause to be paid current by Closing ail assessments and bomeownsr*
association dues,
10-2 Conditio A of Property. Seller warrants thai the Property will be in thefollowingoondttu>nON THE DATE SELLER
DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER:
») the Property shall ba broom-desn and free of debns and personal belongings. Any Seller or tenant movin<j*ralaiod
! lamage lo the Property stall be repaired at Seller's expense;
(b) tho heating, cooliixj, electrical, plumbing and sprinKIer systems and fixtures, and the appliances and fireplaces v*li be
in working order and nt for their Intended purposes,
(c) the roof and foundation shall be free of leaks Known to Seller;
(d) any private well or septic tank serving the Property shall ha*e applicable permit, and shell DO in wgrkino order and
lit for it* intended purpose; and
(a) the Property and Improvements, including the landscaping, wW ba In the same general condition as (hoy wore on me
date of Acoeptanc*.
11. WALKTHROUGH INSPECTION. Before Settlement, Buyer may. upon reasonable notice end at a reasonable time,
conduct a "walkthrough' Inspection of the Property to determine only that the Property Is "as represented,' meaning that the
itcnts referenced in Sections 11,8.4 and 10 2 f'the Items'*) are respectively present, tepeired/cnanged as agreed, and i<\ tho
warranted condition. If tha Items are rot as represented, Seller WL prior lo Settlement, replace correct or rzpdi ths Items
or, with the consent of Buyer (and L e n ^
Thefallure
toconduda\M^-throuah inspection, OJ to claim that an Hem Is not as represented, shall not constitute a waJvor by Buyer of
the right 10 receive, on the data of possession, the items as represented.
12. CHANGES OURtNQ TRANSACTION. Seller agrees thflt harts tho date of Acceptance until tfw date ot Oostng, nono of
the following shall ocour without the prior written cooeem o( Buyer: (a) no chingas In any oxjsfcng Jeasos shall be mide; (b)
no now leases shaft be entered into; (c) no substantial alterations or Improvements to tho Property shall bemado or undertaken;
and <d) no furtherfinancialencumbrances to the Property shaH be made.
1$. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a c o r p o r a ^
entity, tho person executing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or her authority 10 do so and to bind Buyer and Seller.
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with Its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Saner Disclosures,
constitutes the entire Contract between the parlies and supersedes and replaces any and el prior negotiations, representations,
warranties, understandings or contracts between the parfios. This Contract cannot be changed excopt by written agreem snt
Of the parties.
15. DEPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any depute. artsifMi prior to or after Closir^, related 10 tWs Contract
<K]SHALL ( J MAY (upon mutual agreement Of the parties) first be submits to mediation. If the parties agrootomediation,
(heoteptfa shall be submitted to mediation through a mediation provider mutually agreed-upon by the pomes. Each party
apees to boar its own costs of mediation. If mediation fate, the other procedure* and remedies aveJebl* under this Contract
shall apply- Nothing In this Section 15 shall prohibit any pany from seeking emergency equitable relief pending modiatba
1S. DEFAULT. I/ Buyer defaults, Setter may elect either to retain the Earnest Money Deport as liquidated damages, or to
return It and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this Oontrad or pursue other remedies available at tew. if Soilor defaults, in
addWon to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect etthec to socept from Seller a sum equal lo the Eaoust
Money Deposit as liquidated demagog, or may sue Salter to spectfieatty enforce thts Contract or pur*ue other remedies
available at law. If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay thefiquidaiadoameoos to Buyer upon
demand. It is agreed that denial of a Loan Application made by the 8uyer k not a default and isfic/vemodbySoction 2 3(b).
17, ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. In the event of ligation or binding arbitration to enforoa mis Contract, lhc prevailing
party shau be ar*Bed to costs and reasonable attorney few. However, attorney fees shall not be awardod for participation in
mediation under Section 1S,
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1&. NOTICES, Except as provided in Section 23, aii notices required under this Contra* Must be, (a) m writing; (b) signed
by the party Giving notice; and (C) receivedtythe other party or the other party's agent no later than the applicebte date
referenced tn mis Contract.
10, ABROGATION, Except for the provisions of Sections 10,1,10.?, 15 and 17 and express warranties made in lh$ Contract
the provisions of this Contact shallnol apply afler Closing
20. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss to the Propsrty. indudina physical damage or destruction to the Pioperry or i($
Improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tsar and loss caused by a taking in eminent domain, shall be borno
by Setter until the transaction is dosed.
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE Tirneisof the esserx* regards the dales set f ^
Extension* must be
agreed to m writing by all parties. Unless r # > e n j ^ explicitly stated In this Contract' (a) performance under each Section of
this Contract wKch references a date shall absolutely be required by 5:00 PMtoountaJpTlmo en the stated date, end fb) the
term 'days* shall mean calendar days end shaJt be oounted bfrtfnnfnp on the day following the event wrxchtfigaor*tho amino
r^cMremont fue.. Acceptance* recent of fh* Setter D»doeures, etc). Performance date* wd times referenced herein shaft
not be binding upon thfeoompanlee, tenders, appraisers end others nc< pertiestoWs Contract, except as otherwise agreed
to \n writing by such norvparty.
22. FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of tfvs Contract any
adderKtaandcountenjff^
ind any addenda and counkNOTm lYti^
23. ACCEPTANCE- *AoceptancefooogfS when Salter or Buy^
(*)$*gn*
the OfI vr or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance: and (b) comm uricates to the other party or to tho other part/s
agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required.
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES. Buyer end Seller egres that the loltowfrxj deedlirreser^^prylothUConlraot:
(a) Application Deadline

/ \ | CK

(b) SellerDiadotufeDtedHn*

(Date)

\Q ASA^S

4^ q<L<fttS&
Q

(c) EveluaHorw s, Inq^peoHoneDeedtlne

\Q A y / f

(d) SettlementOeedline

%Q J*^X P

V qrc^^5efcsT
ar<qkskfa\

ID T M 6 FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Prop#rtvon th^above tenns and conditions. II
afcoept this offer by: y * » ( ] AM t > { P M Mountain Time on H - T # ^fc»(Date), this offer shaM
Jr#ksrage shall returnithe Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer.

TTSfgng&Sf*

{bfferbatej

—(BUj^rTSgnaSSJ
m

Trwtetw of th« i t * * * Off* BttM •hill be r*Htt*i \***** &Ur

r

(OffftM"

H M M W M * B**r
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ADDENDUM NO. J
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
TH»l$W*lVlAt>OtHDUII t JCOUKTWQFFER to that AEAl ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT' «h«-REM?) * * »« OHtr

her ibv lnooroormtod * * curt Of ih* ftfcP'C:

V^^A^ii^^

^-"/

bo

/*>/V,r*

lyy ^

s ? < v , ^ "f^-MW-r

^ ^ . M ^ i l

£Vrw.«cP p K n 4 n * i f

—

To th# e*t*rt the Urm* of ttf* AOOENOUM modify of eonflW *Sfr *ty P * « w of ttw HEPC. Irtdw*^ all prtor addtwidi * * *
oouftfcroffow, Ibosotomr*did! contoL All oft* t*m« oftotftEPC*IrtcWif* l/f prior odder** tiKfcOtf Altfoftt*, not motffiod by this
ATO6NQUM*ha«wnainthowme. ^Jfi^Hirf 1ft«y*fihal! h«w» unW ^filftL. I J AM [ ffpf* McuiiUh Tiro* an
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ . , , JO*Ufl>to**ro>t the term* of thl« AODENtHJMfaaawdanc* with tht provlflone o( Socdon * * of th* REPC.
1. Vie after «* **t forth in W* AOMNDUM sb*U IAJ**

Buy«r { ] Soiler 8'Qf^urt

(Date)

(Hm»)

I ]8 ^

f I Sol»w 8*gn*iurt

(Bale)

pW)

ACC«nANCS^UNTCR«TTt*teJ€CfI10f<
CHECK ONE.
[ } ACCEPTANCE ( ] M t o f ( ]9uy^h«f^M««pU^tofm4ofthi4AOO£NDOM.
P<UOOW4TEHOfPifti > 4 M l i r j k t o ^ r P*W&LV a eoixteftffor the terns of attach** ADDENDUM NO. 3

w*#^

T*

2

m,

^ ^~

I J WCJ6CTKW; [ ] S # * * f l J§uy*f (*}*cu ft#teojoino,ADDENDUM,
GBaiUOiro)

"w

(Dafo)

(Tin*)"™""'

(signatufe)

"

'

(Date)

(Tiro)

1 H * ft*** *W*OV«D tY THt UTAH NCAt ESTATE COfcltf MttJON AMP THIS QtFKtOF THC VTAH AttOHNfY Of NEfWL,
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ADDENDUM NO,
5S>
ffiSS*

fg^f

TO

m tW

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

"

THIS 16 AN [ xl ADDENDUM [ ] COUWTMOFFM to thtt REAL E3TATE PURCHASE CCWTRACT (iha 'REPC") with
an Offer Reference Dete o(7^?^^(\?
induding aH prbr addenda and counteroffers, between
st-r^han & Afm^ini-+« T.T.C
as Buyer, and ...Poaner
» Seller,
raVflfdinqi the Property located at _ 350 O C T Valley Drivi
_. The
followingtermsare hereby incorporated aa part of the REPC:
Buyer to provide toHs«ll«r a Surety Bond for the S e l l t r s TinancinRi di
per Real Estate Purch*«* Contract end a l l Sailer finnnr.lug nHrfftntinmff
artd a l l otln-r jiJrtmriiTniw ™ rh* r ^ n r r ^ f

on 3.1Q Beer V a l l i y D r i v e .

..

to be provided W o r * closing nf fVt» pr<sp**T>yr Th* closing s h a l l t>« on or before
August 7.; 2002* 3 ; 0 ° M Mountain Time, All prorations s h a l l etay the eame
August 2 2002,

Buyer to pay e f f S t l l a r financing In f u l l before ttaxtlng

any construction on property.

__

To the extent the terms of thte ADDENDUM modify or conflict wtth any provisions erf the REPC, Including all prior addenda
and counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other t©rmc of the REPC, Inoludlng all prior eddenda and counteroffers, not
modified by thte ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [ ] Seller [y^iuyer shall havo until
[ JAM[ J PM
Mountain Time
to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM In aooordanoe wKh the
provlftlons of S«ntlnn^S5^l tta RFPn UntotoTOaccepted, the offer as set forth In thl* ADDENDUM f hall lapco,
I ] Buyer k$ Seller Signature

Date

Time

( JBuyerf ] Seller Signature

Data

Time"

AttECTANCE/COUNTEROFFHJWEJECTlON
CHECKi
t><[ A C j r t r r t i C E : f

]BeH*fV40uyerhwTeby accepts ttw terms of this ADDENDUM.
] Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer Ihe terms of anaohed ADDENDUM NO._

(Signature)
I )

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

(&"$£)

(Tjmo)

(D25J

(TJrnej"

REJECTION! [ J Seller [ ] Buyer rajecta the foregoing ADDENDUM.

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

TW8 FORM APPROVED »Y THE UTAH HEAL WSTKK COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THg UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
EffECTIVH AUGUST 17,1996. fT REPLACE* AND SUPERSEDES A U PREVIOUOLY AWhOVED VERSIONS OP T H » FORM.
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ADDENDUM NO. 5
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
THIS IS AN [ X ] ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (tho -REPC) with an Offer
Reference Date of July 23, 2002
, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, between Strachflnj*
Associates LLC
as Buyer, and Michael Posner
as Seller, regarding tho
Property located at 350 Deer Valley Dr.
. The following terms are
i
hereby incorporated as part of the REPC:

Buyer shall have an extention to close on or before August 9t 2002 5:00 PM Mountain time.

To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, Including all prior addenda and
counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, Including all prior addenda and oounteraffers, not modified by this
ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [ X ] Seller [ 1 Buyer shall have until 5:00
[ ] AM [X] PM Mountain Time on
r(Date), to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the REPCC
Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse.

ignature

(Date)

( T i m e f '
(Time)

[ ] Buyer ( J Seller Signature

(Date)

(Time)

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION
CHECK ONE:
[ } d ACCEPTANCE: [ JSeller [ J Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM.
\Ji Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO.

(Signature)

^

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

„

.

(Date)

(Time)

(Date)

(Timo)

[ ] REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM.

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

THIS FORM APPROVED 8Y THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL,
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 17,1938. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM.

FROM : COTTONWOOD SKI LODGJMQ

P\\\^

iS

PHONE NO. :

- iV*^ ^S

Pug. 13 2002 81:04PM Pi

L/nnsbfUes&rs
Page_1

of 1

ADDENDUM NO. 6
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
THIS IS AN [ X ] ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the -REPC") with an Offer
Reference Date of July 23, 2002
. , including all prior addenda and counteroffers, between Strachan &
Associates LLC
as Buyer, and Michael Posner
as Seller, regarding the
Property located at 350 Peer Valley Dr.
_• The following terms are
hereby incorporated as part of the REPC:

Buyer shall have an extention to close on or before August 14, 2002 5:00 PM Mountain time.

To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, Including all prior addenda and
counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC> including ail prior addenda and counteroffers, not modified by this
ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [ X I Seder t 1 Buyer shall have until 5:00
[ 1 AM [XI PM Mountain Time on
.(Date), to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the ftEPC.
Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse.

w

Buyer [ ] Seller Signature

(Date)

(Time)

^ ^

[ ] Buyer ( ] Seller Signature

(Date)

(Time)

(Date)

(Time)

(Date)

(Time)

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION
CHE£KONE:
P^TACCEPTANCE: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM.
[ ] CpgEffpROFFEj?: [ 1 Seller { ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO.

€/ J3/02
(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

[ ] REJECTION: [ ] Seller ( J Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM.
(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFTCE OF THE OTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 17,1998, JT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSION8 OF THIS FORM,

AUG-14-2002 WED 12:11 PM

r\W^

•MHS

'"*}PRO REALTY GROUP

' JV^^S

FAX NO.

pQ1

4660689

P. 01

OhrvdtpU*jiV\
Ffcgc Jl

of J

ADDENDUM N O ^ 9
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
THIS IS AN [ X ] ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the -REPC") with an Offer
Reference Date of July 23, 2002
, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, between Slrachah &
Associates LLC ~
as Buyer, and Michael Posner
ns Seller, icgarding the
Property located at 350 Deer Valley Dr.
. The following terms are
hereby Incorporated as part of the REPC:
?C
Buyer shall have an extention to close on or before A u g u s t ^ f f i 2002 5:00 PM Mountain time.

To the extent the terms of rhls ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, Including all piior addenda and
counteroffers, theso terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, noi modifiedtaythis
ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [X ] Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until 5:00
[ ] AM [X] PM Mountain Tirno on
JData), to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the REPC.
Unless so accepted, the offer as set forrh in this ADDENDUM shall lapse.

w

8 - ' 3 -O 7L

u

Buyer ( ] Seller Signature

(Date)

(Time)

1

top
^

>ffig&<^'
—

-

^

&lkl£!L
(Dale)

(Time)

(Dalo)

("lime)

(Daiej

(Tima)

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTTEROFFER/REJECTION
CHECK ONE:
[ } ACCEPTANCE: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM.
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: [ ] Soffer [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO.

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

[ J REJECTION: [ ] Sefler [ ] Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM,
(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AHO THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENgflAl,
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 17,18B& IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FfcflM.

AUG-22-2002 THU 07:02 PM

~UPRO REALTY GROUP

FAX NO. f

660689

P. 02

rasO

,or j

..

ADDENDUM NO. 8
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
THIS IS AN [ X ] ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with an Offer
Reference Date of July 23, 2QQ2
, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, between Slrachan &
Associates LLC
as Buyer, and Michael Posner
as SelFer, regarding the
Property located at 350 Deer Valley Dr.
_ _ . The following terms are
hereby incorporated as part of the REPC:

1. Buyer will increase Surety Bond to cover new amount Seller will carry,
2. Rate is increased to 10%.

^_

3. Buyer will give Seller a check in the amount of $1,100.00. to cover costs of testing fees for land
being purchased.
4. All other items on contract to remain the same.

To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda and
counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, not modified by this
ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [ X ] Sailor [ ] Buyer shajl have until ^ l Q f l _ [ ] AM [ X ] PM Mountain Time on
,
Pate), to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the REPC.
Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse.

^

y

fl/Z/k-OZler Signature

(Date)

T.MO 1%\
(Time)

[ ] Buyer [ ] Seller Signature

(Date)

(1 ime)

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION
CHJSCK ONE:
X ^ A C C E P T A N C E : I 1 S 9 l , e r t ] Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM.
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyar presenters a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO.,

.

-Z/0-?.
(Signature)

IDate)

(Tifte)(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Date)

(Time)

[ J REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM.

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL,
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 1 7 , 1 m IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM.
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ADDENDUM 2
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FINANCIAL GUARANTEE

THIS GUARANTEE is made and entered Into, by and between AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES
CORPORATION, hereinafter called GUARANTOR; and STRACHAN & ASSOCITES, LLC, hereinafter
called BORROWER, for the benefit of MICHAEL C. POSNER, hereinafter called LENDER.
WITNESSETH
WHEREAS, LENDER expects to loan to BORROWER certain assets, namely $260,000 (two hundred
and sixty thousand dollars), balance of purchase price of a certain property located at 350 Deer Valley
Drive, Park City, Utah., in terms of an agreement entered Into between Borrower and Lender, dated
August 2*, 2002, hereinafter referred to as the loan, and
WHEREAS, BORROWER desires GUARANTOR to act as GUARANTOR, at BORROWER'S request, to
LENDER, for the amount on the Loan described below; and
WHEREAS, GUARANTOR Is willing to act as GUARANTOR subject to the provisions hereof;
NOW THEREFORE, FOR VALUE RECEIVED, including the promises and mutual covenants herein set
forth, BORROWER, LENDER and GUARANTOR do hereby mutually agree as follows;
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
1.

DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this Guarantee, the terms and phrases listed below shall have only the
meaning shown when used herein;
(a) The*GUARANTOR" means the GUARANTOR whose name appears on the face of
the Guarantee.
(b) The "LENDER" means the LENDER to whom the GUARANTOR is obligated and
whose name appears in this Guarantee, and who makes a loan of securities to the
BORROWER and whose interest in the Loan instrument is an equitable interest under a
contract or promissory note.
(c) The "BORROWER" means the one stated as BORROWER on the Loan instrument,
whether single or multiple individuals, partnership* corporation or other legal entity.
(d) The ^Loan Instrument" means any written evidence of obligation, including a
promissory note, loan agreement, Asset Holder Agreement, or other debt instrument,
obtained from the BORROWER by the LENDER which bears a genuine signature of the
BORROWER and all other parties to the instrument, is complete on its face, and is valid
and enforceable against the BORROWER.
(e) A "Loss" means the aggregate amount of an unpaid principal and lease fees not to
exceed $260,000 (two hundred and sixty thousand dollars)on the loan instrument plus
interest payments, evidencing an Eligible Loan which is in default notwithstanding
anything to the contrary herein, loss shall exclude penalties of any nature and expenses
of collection, and shall be reduced by any payments made by the GUARANTOR. The
aggregate of all losses under the Guarantee shall In no event exceed the Limit of
Liability stated in the Guarantee.

(f) A "Loan" means an advance of funds or securities evidenced by a loan instrument,
the proceeds of which have been or are to be used solely for the project &s declared to
the LENDER and the GUARANTOR as set forth above.
(g) The "Eligible Loan" means the total amount due inclusive of finance charges, if any.
The loan shall be evidenced by a written instrument which bears a genuine signature of
the BORROWER as well as all other parties. The Loan shall comply with all Federal,
State, Province, and local rules, statutes and ordinances.
(h) An "Extension1* means the permission granted to the LENDER to allow a payment to
be deferred. These deferred payments must be paid before a loan is satisfied.
(i) The "Limit of Liability" means: the principal amount of two hundred and twenty five'
thousand dollars ($260,000), plus interest payments, the aggregate amount as stated
shall be the GUARANTOR'S maximum liability under this Guarantee.

0) The "Application" means any statement and/or presentation, either orally or in writing,
made by the BORROWER, LENDER or their agents, servants or employees, In order to
induce the GUARANTOR to issue this Guarantee.
(10 The "Payment" means a deposit by the BORROWER with the LENDER of funds or
the return of securities which represents the full or partial payment on the Loan
Instrument evidencing an eligible loan,
(I) The "Date of Default" means the earliest date upon which an installment payment was
due which was not paid by the BORROWER according to the terms of the Loan
Instrument.
(m) The "Guarantee Period" means from August 28,2002 to August 28,2003, and
renewable annually thereafter for a period not to exceed ten years. In no event shall this
Guarantee be called or loss claimed earlier than September 28,2002.

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO RECOVERY
Each of the following is a condition precedent to the obligation of the GUARANTOR to
Indemnify against a loss hereunder, and each condition must occur prior to any liability or
obligation of the GUARANTOR to cover such loss.
(a) Prior to making a loan of the securities, the LENDER shall obtain financial
information and representations from the BORROWER, The Lender will do such due
diligence as it, in its sole discretion, deems necessary, which information will be made
available to the Guarantor at the Guarantor's request. The Lender will consider such
credit factors as a prudent person but one who does not routinely enter such
transactions.
(b) If, after the loan is made the LENDER discovers any material misstatements in the
information given by the BORROWER, or misusage of the proceeds of the loan by the
BORROWER, the LENDER shall promptly report such discovery to the GUARANTOR.
(c) All payments received on account of the Loan Instrument, must be applied to the
principal and interest payment due in their order, in the absence of specific written
instructions from the GUARANTOR to do otherwise.

rrtA nu. oui 6<L6 WUO
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(d) The LENDER shall give written notice of default within thirty (30) days after the event
and submit a claim, if the default is not rectified by the sixtieth (60th) day of default.
3.

EXCLUSIONS
This Guarantee shall not indemnify the LENDER for any reasons other than for the default of the
BORROWER, including but not limited to any loss:
(a) Resulting from the successful assertion of a defense against the LENDER releasing
the BORROWER from the obligation to pay the Eligible Loan, or any judicial order,
government statute, rule or regulation which otherwise extends, modifies or releases the
BORROWER from obligation.
(b) Resulting directly or indirectly from any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of any
officer or employee of the LENDER its successor, assigns or predecessors in interest, or
any other person or business entity acting alone or in collusion with the BORROWER
who is a party to the obligation covered by the GUARANTOR hereunder.
(c) Resulting from forgery,
(d) Resulting from any failure to comply with Federal, State, Province and local rules,
statutes and regulations.

4.

CANCELLATION OF THE GUARANTEE
Cancellation by the LENDER: This Guarantee may be canceled by the LENDER by returning it to
the GUARANTOR or by mailing to the GUARANTOR a written notice of cancellation stating
when, thereafter such cancellation shall be effective. Such cancellation shall not alter or affect
the GUARANTORS obligation with respect to any Claims Notice which was received by it prior to
the cancellation effective date.

5.

NOTICE OF DEFAULT
The LENDER shall as soon as possible, and in no event later than thirty (30) days after the
event, notify the GUARANTOR in writing that payments or interest under the Loan Instrument
are in default The LENDER shall also send a Notice of Default to the BORROWER and provide
a copy of such notice to the GUARANTOR. Monthly reports indicating the status of the Loan is in
default shall be given to the GUARANTOR thereafter until such Default is secured, an extension
approved, or transfer of equity has been effected.

6.

SUBMISSION OF A CLAIM
In the event that the Loan Instrument is in default for thirty (30) days and the BORROWER, after
notice from the LENDER as required herein, has not made payment to rectify the default, by the
sixtieth (60th) day of default, the LENDER shall, within ten (10) days thereafter, send a notice of
claim to the GUARANTOR. Upon receipt of a Notice of Claim, the GUARANTOR shall take one
of the following actions:
(a) Pay installments due thereon;
(b) Pay the aggregate amount, less all prior payments by the BORROWER.

7.

CONVEYANCE OF SECURITY OR COLLATERAL
As an express condition to the settlement of any claim hereunder, the LENDER shall tender to
the GUARANTOR an assignment of the lien, or collateral, within a reasonable period of time
after settlement is made in accordance with the rights of subrogation herein (paragraph 10),

8.

AMOUNT OF LOSS
(a) Within sixty (60) days of a submission of claim, and subject to the provisions of
paragraphs 12 and 13, the GUARANTOR shall pay such claim by paying LENDER
directly.
(b) In any event, the GUARANTOR may elect either to make installment payments in
accordance with the Loan Instrument which is in default (in which case the
GUARANTOR will, at the time of its first installment payment, make all payments in
default) or unless other agreements are agreed to, or replacement instrument is provided
for with the concurrence to the LENDER, or pay the LENDER the full amount of loss
calculated in accordance with paragraph, 1 (e).
(c) In any eventT there shall be no acceleration of the subject Loan Instrument or the
Eligible Loan, if either is subject to acceleration by the terms hereof.

8.

WHERE NOTICE IS GIVEN
All notices, pleadings, claims, tenders and reports and other data required to be given by the
LENDER to the GUARANTOR shall be sent by courier service or registered mail (return receipt
requested) and directed to the GUARANTOR in care of its Agent of Record as listed,

10.

SUBROGATION
Upon payment of any claim under this Guarantee, the GUARANTOR shall be subrogated to the
LENDER'S rights under the terms of the Loan Instrument and against the BORROWER and any
other party, business entity or organizations liable under the terms of the Defaulted LENDER'S
instrument and against any reserves or holdbacks in the LENDER'S possession. The LENDER
shall execute and deliver at the request of the GUARANTOR all Instnjments and papers and do
whatever else is necessary to transfer, assign and secure such rights, the execution by the
LENDER of a release or waiver of therightto collect the unpaid amount due on any Loan
Instrument shall equally release the GUARANTOR from any further obligation under this
Guarantee as to the Loan Instrument. In the event the Loan Instrument is paid in full, the
GUARANTOR shall be subrogated to therightsof the LENDER under the security and/or
collateral lien on said security and/or collateral to the extent of claim payments made directly by
the GUARANTOR to the LENDER pursuant to this Guarantee.

11.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
(a) Transfer of Interest: Transfer of the BORROWER'S obligations under the Loan
Instrument and of the BORROWER'S interest in any collateral securing such Loan
Instrument shall not be permitted by the LENDER.
(b) Reports and Examinations of Records: The GUARANTOR may at any time call upon
the LENDER for such reports as it may deem necessary and may inspect any accounts
or records of the LENDER which are applicable to the Loan Instrument. Such
examinations shall be made during the normal business hours of the LENDER.

4

(c) Conformity of Statutes: The terms and conditions of the Guarantee, if any, that are in
conflict with the statutes or laws of the jurisdiction where the Guarantee is performed are
hereby amended to conform with the minimum requirements of the State of Utah and
Federal statutes of law,
(d) AH instruments evidencing or securing or otherwise relating to the Loan must be
satisfactory to the GUARANTOR.
(e) Failure by the BORROWER or the LENDER to satisfy any conditions as set forth
above or elsewhere within this Guarantee, shall relieve the GUARANTOR of any
obligations to perform under this instrument, but in such event, all premiums paid shall
be regarded as earned and shall be retained by GUARANTOR.
(f) GUARANTOR shall be liable to LENDER in accordance with this Guarantee, and
LENDER shall not be required to first exhaust its remedies against BORROWER,
(g) Applicability: The terms and conditions of this Guarantee are to the benefit of and be
binding upon the GUARANTOR and the LENDER, their successors and assigns.
(h) Assignment of This Agreement: In order to assign the Guarantee the LENDER shall
complete a Certificate of Assignment and the GUARANTOR shall consent to assignment
in writing by a duly authorized officer of the GUARANTOR. Consent of assignment shall
not be unreasonably withheld be the GUARANTOR; however, the LENDER may not
assign the Guarantee without the prior written consent of the GUARANTOR and this
Guarantee shall be deemed null and void If assigned or transferred without the written
consent of the GUARANTOR, whether such transfer be voluntary or involuntary.
(*) Waiver Provision: No Waiver of any condition or covenant of this Guarantee shall be
effective unless in writing and signed by the party against whom said waiver is asserted
and no failure to exercise and any right or remedy by either the LENDER or the
GUARANTOR shall be considered to impiy or constitute a further waiyer by such part by
name or any other condition, covenant, right remedy, except as provided herein.
(j) Amendments: Notice to any agent or knowledge possessed by any agency or by any
other person shall not effect a waiver or change any part of this Guarantee or stop the
GUARANTOR or the LENDER from asserting any right under the terms of the
Guarantee. The terms of this Guarantee may be waived, amended, or changed only
after written approval of the GUARANTOR by its President, or authorized representative,
agent and/or assigns.
(k) Conflict: It is understood and agreed that in the event of a conflict between provisions
of this form and any expression of intent to cover or any other paper, the provisions of
this form shall apply.

EXPENSES, COMMISSIONS, ETC
BORROWER shall be solely and exclusively responsible for, and shall promptly pay, all fees,
costs and expenses due any agent, broker, attorney, forwarders, finders, or any other party
entitled to receive funds or which may be payable as a result of BORROWER entering into this
Guarantee Agreement

13.

CONSIDERATION TO GUARANTOR
BORROWER shall pay to GUARANTOR the sum of three thousand nine hundred dollars
($3,900) upon the execution of this FINANCIAL GUARANTEE BOND and shall be fully earned
and shall be non refundable for any reason including cancellation. Further, as a condition to
GUARANTOR'S continuing obligation hereunder, BORROWER shall pay to GUARANTOR an
additional one and one half percent (VA %) each year for a period not to exceed a total of ten
(10) years of the unpaid principal balance, or only so long as this Guarantee is required by the
LENDER on or before the fifteenth day prior to the anniversary of the effective date of this
Guarantee. This Guarantee is null and void ab initio in the event of non payment of any amount
due, when due.

14,

BORROWER'S WARRANTY AS TO AUTHORIZATION TO ACT
If BORROWER is a corporation, trust or partnership, association or other legal entity, the
individual or individuals signing the Guarantee Agreement on BORROWER'S behalf hereby
expressly warrant: (a) that each such person has the full and complete authority, pursuant to
appropriate resolution, or other direction in writing of BORROWER'S Board of Directors,
Trustees, General Manager or Managing Board of Directors who have been fully Informed,
concerning this transaction, understand and have approved the provisions of this Guarantee; and
(b) that BORROWER is both in fact and in law, effectively bounded by the provisions of this
Guarantee.

All notices required to be given herein and all correspondence must be sent certified mail, return receipt
requested or by Federal Express to:
LENDER;

Michael C. Posner, c/o The Manager, Caldwell Banker Residential Brokerage, 1750 Park
Avenue, Park City, Utah, 84060

BORROWER: Christopher Strachan: c/o Stephanie Gyllenskog, Allpro, 144 West 100 South, Brigham
City, Utah, 84302
GUARANTOR: Robert V. Murton, President, American Natural Resources Corporation, 10151 Thyme
Circle, South Jordan, Utah* 84095.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, THE GUARANTOR has duly executed this Guarantee and endorsement
attached and has caused these presents to be signed by its duly authorized officer on this 3rd day of
August 2002.

(Signed),

Presidei

./-
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LISTING AGREEMENT & AGENCY DISCLOSURE
THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING DOCUMENT. READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SfGNlNG.

Sl'lN<i AORtr-liMl-NT is entered mio hy and belwson CULDvVfcLL. KANKKK HKUMILK Kt.Ai. i Y <
TtliS USI'1N<, AORr-liMttNT is entered mio hy and belwson COLDWELL fiANKEK PREMIER REALTY
Sdl 1Uhc 'Company")

._

J •tn.k&7A.*£.S.

„^&£*hjU-J

-p~- • •

^

^

" 5- ;

1. TERM OK LISTING. The Seller hereby grants 10 ihe Comp^v^nch^
_
l^&ffflStMJtQ
(die wl.:$:mg Agent") o» the authorized agent for the Company., for the period uf . „ _ I M r_.
..
( 6 ? _ Lmoniha
starting on ihe date of execution of this Listing Agreement, and ending at 5 00 P.M. on the _ i e * L day of _ J 2 J £ I £ Z
gpQ££y
. (the "Usting Period").l^j^Exc}nsivc Right ID S e p Lease, or Exchange certain real property owned by the Seller.

^ r i S 3 T t : _ a g p . &UkjJ&Mt&

fir.

tL^&tet.m..

<3k /bf/jstMsy.

4dJ&3

(d*

"Prppeny"). ftt the price and terms stated wfthe attached board'association property data information form, or at such other price and
terms to wh»*ri the Seller may agiee in siting. The Listing AgeM agrees to use reasonable efforts to find a buyer or lenanr for the
Property.
' 1. BROKERAGE FEE. If. during the Listing Period, the Company, the Luting Agent, the Seller, another real estate agent,
or anyone eUe locates a party who U ready, titling and able to buy, lease, oi exchange (collectively referred to as "acquire") the
Property, or any part thereof, at rhe listing price and term* statedop the attached board'aasociation property data information form, or
_ ^ ^ ^ * * n y other price or terms to which the Seller may agree in «(rtu5g\ttoe Seller agrees to pay to the Company a brokerage: fee ID the
Jyjrjr
amount of ]
} 10%,
\
l*V.y
(
] ©%, | A ]\J% ofottrti aeqaiaitiw p t m , plus an Adftimifllrali'igffonrptttucg
^Zjf
F « uijljLjEHOMnf of ftl'rfri The brokerage fee and administra^jve^rnpliance fee> unless otherwise agreed in waiting by the Seller and
£L T
the Company, shall be due and payable on the date of closing ofthc acquisition of the Property. If a rcad>\ willing, and able buyer is
V fO
located as provided h\ this section above, and the Seller refuses 10 contract orto clow, the SellM shall be obligated to Immediately p^y
to the Company the brokerage fee listed above. /* 0 % AJ4t**JL&^
#>
UCHzS^J
3. EXTENSION PERIOD, if within'erne hundred twenty (120) dayi after the tennination or expiration of this Listing
Agreement: the Property is acquired by any party to whom the Property was offered or shown by the Company, the Listing Agent, the
Seller, or another real estate agent during the Listing Period, the Seller agrees to pay to die Company the brokerage fee stated in
Section 2 unless the Seller is obligated to pay a brokerage fee on such acquisition to another brokerage pur&uant \c another va'.iH
listing agreement entered into after the expiration or termination date of this Listing Agreement
4. SELLER WARRANTIES-DlSCtOSURES. The Seller warrant* to the Company that the individual^) or entity luted
above a* "Selier" represents all of the record owners of the Property. The Seller further warrants that it ha? marketable title and an
established right to sell, lease, or exchange the Property. The Seller agrees to execute the necessary documents of conveyance and to
furtiixh the buyer at closing good and marketable title with a policy of title insurance in the amount of the purchase prloe. The Sell?:
agrees to fully inform the Listing Agfnt regarding the Seller's knowledge of the condition of the Property. Upon *ignmg of this Listing
•Agreement, the Seller agrees to personally complete and sign a Soiler's Property Condition Disclosure form. The Seller agrees to
indemnity and hold harmless the Listing Agent and the Company against any elamrf which may arifce from: (i) the Seller's providing
incorrect or inaccurate information regarding -ht Property; (ii) !hc Seller's failure to provide material information regarding the
Property* including, but noi limited to, the condition of all appliances, hearing, plumbing, and electrical fixtures and equipment, sewer,
moisture problems ;n the roof or foundation, the Size of the Property, and the location of properly lines; or (ill) any injuries resulting
from any unsafe conditions wirtun the Property.
5. AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS. The following i* a very important explication about agency relationships between the
buyer, tie seller, the Company, and the real estate agents affiliated with the Company.
*.l Principal or branch Broker. All real estate agtnu must affiliate with s real estate broker. The broker is called
* Principal Broker or Branch Broker (if (he brokerage has a branch office). The broker Is responsible for operation of the brokerage
and for the professional conduct of all agents affiliated with the broker.
5.2 Representing Buyeis and/or Sellers. Through the broker, an agent may represent a seller, a buyer, or, with prior
written consent, both buyer and seller in the same transaction. When representing a seller, the agent is a "Setter's A%cnt"\ when
representing a buyer, the agenl is a "Buyer's Aw"; and when representing both buyer and seller in die same transaction, the agent
is a "/.united ^crtf".

5-3 Requirement of Written Agreement, To represent a buyer, a seller, or both, o written Q$>eermr\t is r^uind by
Marc (6i*. Except as provided below, the Principal or Branch Broker also represents whomever the agent represents; and regardless
of whom *>.<; agent represents, the agent owes a duty of honesty and fair dealing to hli parties.
5 4 Seller'.-, Agent. A Sellers Agcm assists the selle; in locating a buyer and ;n ns^ohating a transaction suitable to
that seller* .'.pacific needs, A Seller's Agcm has fiduciar)' duties to the seller which include loyally, fill disclosure, confidentiality.
(litigctiGi:. cbfd^ncL', wasthablt cfl/v. tind holding safe monies entrusted to ihe agent.
1.5 Buyers Agent A Buyers Agcm Agists the buyer in locating sud negotiating the acquisition of a property
simabii u. -.r-ai buyer's specific needs. A Buyer's Ageuj^^^Sf ssme fiduciary cutir«to the buyer that t%{j*$er's Agent has to the
el*?P«gn l o ! '}

^ ^
WHirr:. Broktt

CANARY: Agent

J Seller'* initials
PfNK. Siller

Date _

^Ij&r**'

' , n
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5/» Limited AgcrM. A Limited Agent icprcaecu huh the b\tyw emu »elhr- tit '-nv <air,/.- uvmsacuoti <md u;,.*i\*s both
.«<(»€!> in ucgotuiiing a tx-.utuatly acceptable transaction. A Limited Aj;cnt hox (\dnc\nty tiw.tc.s lo htf*t tuu-tnty, but ihoso v.utics :uc
"limited" because rhe agem camot give both buyer U.HJ sdlt-.r undivided loyAUy. full confident)* It ;yrtnriJuM diuiostiK For ;'u;
reason, 2 Limited Agent must remain nwtrJ whsu negotiating a transaction between buyer ar.o seller.
5 */ R.i&lu to Ocsignato an AJCCIU When choosing u brvkejii^c, iba ,u-lfrr f»- huyw muy <ic.\sgtntit •vh.'cii a-jen? or
agent* iii thai brokerage will represent (hem &<; Their w$p»:clive Seller's Agcni of D-jyCi"^ A:j<nt. By Mfcnij.g r;ii> Ai;.-cement. Uu*
Seller des:j;i;aie f . Ihc following ugcnt(s) to i-cprttfciU the Seller (check applicable box):

V j SELLER'S AGENT AND THE PRINCIPAL/BRANCH BROKER; or
{ | ALL AGENTS IN THE COMPANY AND THE PRINCIPAL/BRANCH BROKER
5.S I«-Housc Sale. If '.he Company is representing both the buyer and seller in the same transaction (through one m
more agents) ;i i* referred to as an "ln*Hous? Sale". Most In-House Sales involve limited agency and there is the potential for
conflict. For example, agents affiliated vith the Company often discuss with each other the needs of their respective buyer or seller
client?. Such discussions may irut4vert9?4y compromise confidential information provided to those agems by *heir respective
clients. For that reason, the Company has policies designed to protect the confidentiality of discussions between agents and access to
confidential ciieitf and transaction files.
5.9 Disclosure Obligation. The buyer and seller mUst bt Informed in writing if the proposed transaction is an InHouae Sale. Although it i$ the business practice of the Company to participate in In-House Sales, neither the buyer nor the seller n
required to do so. Ouc (o the potential for conflict, if the buyer and seller agree K> an la-House Sale thty will each be asked to sign A
Limited Agency Consent Agreement before- starting negotiations.
5.10 Out of town or Unavailable. The Seller audiorhxs the Sellers Agent or the Principal/Branch Broker lo
appoint another agent In the Company to wnporarity represent the Seller, if recessary, in the event the Seller's Agent or the
Principal/Branch Broker will be unavailable to assist the Seller.
6. PROFESSIONAL ADVICE. The Company and the Listing Afcent arc Wined in the marketing of real estate. Neither the
Company nor any agents affiliated with tha Company are trained lo provide the Seller or any prospective buyer with legal OJ ta*
advice, or with technical advice regarding the physical condition of the Property. If the Scllar desires advice regarding: (i) legal o: tax.
mattery (ii) the physical condition of the Property; (iii) this Listing Afcteement; or (iv) any transaction arising out of this Listing
Agreement; the Listing Agent and the Company STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THB SELLER OBTAIN SUCH INDEPENDENT
PROFESSIONAL A0VJCE.
7, DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to this Listing Agreement shall firat be
submitted to mediation in accordance with the Utah Real Estate Buycx/Seller Mediation Rule* of th» American Arbitration
Association, Each party a#rc*s to bear its own costs of mediation. Any agreement signed by the parties pursuant to the mediation shall
be binding. If madiitxon hite, the procedures applicable andremediesavailable undei this Listing Agreement *h*n apply.
B. ATTORNEY FEES. Except as provided in section 7. in case of the employment of an attorney in any matter arising out
of thia Listing Agreement (including a sale of the Property) the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive from the other party all
costs and reasonable attorney fees, whether the matter U reiolved through court action or otherwise. If, through no fault of the
Company, any litigation arise* out of the Seller's employment of the Company under this Listing A$ieemec\t, the Seller agrees to
indemnify the Company from all coats and attorney fees incurred \?y the Company in pursuing and/or defending such action.
9, INFORMATION RELEASE. The Company is authored to obtain financial information from any mortgagee or orhci
parry holding a lien or interest on the Property.
10. MULTIPLE LISTING SERVICE £ INTERNET. 'Hie Company is authorized and instructed to offer mi*. Property
thjough the Multiple Listing .Service of the
^ ^
. ^
Board/Association of
REALTORS. The Seller also authorises the Property to be advertised via the Jntemei by the Company, and by orhev brokerages and
wet $itc* authorized by the Company. The Company is further authorised to disclose afts; closing the final *ale» price of the
Property.

1L KEYBOX. The Company { ) IS { ) IS NOT authorized and instructed to have a keybox installed on the Property. The
Company | |IS ( ) IS NOT authorised to have a ksy to the Property. The Company { \t$\
| IS NOT authorised to hold "Open
Houses" at the Property. The Seller acknowledges that the Company has diseased with the Seller the safeguarding of personal
property and valuables located with:* the Property. The 5ell$r further acknowledges that the Company Is not an insurer againtt the
loss of or damage to personal property; and tbo Seller accept* full responsibility for any los« or dunnage that might result from the u*e
of the key ot the keybox from any source whatsoever and agrees to hold the Company and the Listing Agent harmless from any and
al! liability a* a reault of having the key xo the Property, and having the keybox installed on the Property. If a tenant occupies (he
Property on other than a "nightly rental basis", the tenant agrees to the installation of a keybox and joins in the waiver and release of
the Luting Agent and the Company as provided above.
,
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12 SIGN AGE. r«\c Company u authorised 'o place an appropriate sign or the Property.
13. ATi'ACHMLNT The pio\ision» of the attached board/association property data urormalion forrr ate irtCorpOrAf
,s ' J u i - w o 1«J orcei to complete the pioperty data information form the Listing Agent will provide the S*tUi -*uh a c^i
%'M'in.i w ol the square iooiage of the Property As an cit.roate the square looUixe figm* *h»H r.ot H< rthtd upon by th« Sc»l*' <
biiA-i ip IIKIJ decisis to purchase/sell the Property.
14. EARNEST MONEY DEPOSITS As part of an after to purchase the Property, a potential &u>ci will rywcal > d«ui\
T
,.»rt"U Money Dcpow «o the brokerage that nwttts the buyer m preparing that offer The C o m p l y *•'> hereoy authorised »:\tf On
ie J. «ept on behalf of the Sellei, ard !0 hold in its tnut accounr. any Earnest. Money Deposit delnered to '111? Company bY a pot
buyer Itctfurdleis of whether the Ccmpany ot another brokerage hoWi tbc Earnest Money Deposit ,f the buyer defaults ?
•"mfcnji all o- any portion of the Earnest Money Depomt, fhc Company ^rutl). ufon such default ct furftitare* be ertUt'.eC to \<*
i )'2\ «,.!• rhc defaulted or forfeited <um up to the ton;! brokerage fee referenced m Section ? above The balance, if any, *b
d stn&j'.ed to the Scllci
15. PRELIMINARY TITLE REPORT. Jn oidu to, u) identify potential title concerns, and (dj avoid possible del.
marking the ?roperr>, tl\e Company recommend* tha; the Sella, upon signing this Listing Agreement, authorize the Compe
older a Preliminary Title Report (*TR") on the Property The Seller, f
J AUTHORIZES the Company to immediately ovder
through a title insurance provider.! J DOES NOT AUTHORIZE the Company to immediately order a PR and [ J ENCLOS
CHECK for the cost of the same { ] AUTHORIZES THE PR FEE to be credited toward the Wk insurance costs char;
closing (a bill for The PR will be issued if the order is cancelled).
1(5. EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY, The Property will be presented ui compliance <Mth Federal. State and loca
dta-rumination taw*
17. ASSIGNMENT The Company and Seller agree thai this Listing Agreement is not a personal service contract, an<
be freely assigned and transferred by the Company to its successor and assigns,
18. FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMENT, Facsimile transmission of a Signed copy of this Listing Agreement
letransmission of any signed facsimile transmission, *haJl be the <tame as delivery of an original If this transaction involves rru
Sellers facsimile transmissions may be executed in counterparts
19. ENTIRE AGREEMENT This Listing Agreemtm may not be changed modified or altered, except by prior *
consent of th* parties hereto
TIIE UNDERSIGNED SELLER docs hereby agree to the terms of this i isting Agreement

yr

r#cy&»^—-—

^3cTHrJf Signature

Addre:

Seller's Signature

AddresWPhone

Seller % Signature

Date

Address-Thane

~*~

Dja*

THIS LISTING AGREEMENT shall become effective only upon acceptance b} CoJdwcll Ba^iker Premier Realty as evidencec*
signatures below
ACCEPTED by CoMwcll Banke- Premier Raa'ty

0(T

**W

3

°r

Date

3

Mfotging Broker

J

fC-r

WHITr D«okei

CANARY ^ v

"T seller's ImcUfe

P»\fK St'lcr

Date

Date m

*

